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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to find out how other states view Norway as an 
international peace negotiator, and whether the Norwegians` own perception of 
themselves on this matter match the views of others. I also aim to look at how the 
Norwegian self image has developed.  
It is a qualitative study which is largely based on semi-structured interviews with 
experts from the political arena, non-governmental organizations and research 
institutions as well as academics and journalists. The interview objects are from 
Norway, as well as from Sweden, Canada, Sri Lanka, the US, Switzerland, the UK 
and Finland.   
The main argument of this thesis is that there exists a gap between the way 
Norwegians see themselves as international peace negotiators and the view others 
have of the Norwegians` role. This is due to factors such as the Norwegian national 
media`s biast selection of topics on published stories and, the fact that the Norwegian 
public appreciates the efforts of the peace negotiators, rather than what these people 
actually achieve. Efforts are more easily spotted than results, as results often appear 
over a long period of time.                                                                                                      
Another factor is the delusional self image some Norwegian politicians possess. As 
they display this image publically, the Norwegian people are left with a wrongful 
illustration of themselves.  
I have chosen to include the interview guide used at the end of the thesis. This is done 
to make it even clearer what I have asked the different categories of people.  
This is a well documented thesis which indicates a trend of overrating Norway`s view 
of itself as an international peace negotiator which should be re-evaluated.  
 
100 pages ( 30029 words)  
Supervisor: Dr. Arild Underdal.  
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1. Introduction  
This thesis will focus on how Norway is seen as an international peace facilitator by 
other states, and how Norwegians see themselves. Is there a gap between the 
Norwegian and non-Norwegian perceptions?  If so, how has this self-image 
developed? 	  
Firstly, I will start by presenting some background information with regards to the 
situation Norway found itself in during and after the Cold War, followed by 
information on the Oslo Process and how this shaped Norway`s peace negotiation 
future.                                                                                                                                                           
The Methods chapter will include explanations of the techniques and procedures I 
have used to gather and analyse the date. It will highlight the methodological 
challenges met whilst writing the thesis as well as an evaluation section which will   
explain the measures taken to address these methodological challenges. Following this 
will be an overview of what sources have been chosen to write this thesis.  
A theory chapter will discuss several questions. As my research has led me to believe 
there exists intended shared characteristics within the Norwegian population, I will 
look into constructivist literature discussing the collective identity. The theory chapter 
will also include definitions of negotiation, the different varieties of third party 
engagement, the conditions needed to be in place for the use of these strategies, what 
is needed for a peace agreement to be signed, as well as what can be expected from 
Norway according to all this.  
In the Analysis I will look into whether the “The Norwegian Model” is a concept used 
today. Following this will be a section on the characteristics of Norwegian peace 
politics which will include the special relationship between NGOs and the 
government. The analysis will also explore the Norwegian identity; how do 
Norwegians see themselves, and how did this reputation emerge?  Finally the analysis 
will investigate the possible advantages Norway has as an international peace 
negotiator.  
	  	  
5	  
The fifth section of the thesis will look into how Norway is viewed as an international 
peace negotiator by other states, and why the country would chose to get involved in 
this type of politics.  
Before the main conclusion, I will briefly discuss which precautions Norway may face 
in the continuation with peace negotiations. 
~ 
Conflict resolution is a complex concept. It has many dimensions, such as power 
politics, conflict transportation, structural prevention and so on.1 “Peace negotiations 
are not just the point in time where you sit around a table discussing issues”2, the 
Norwegian Ambassador to the US, Wegger Ch. Strømmen very correctly points out. 
During the Cold War states were locked to either one side of the conflict. This was 
also true for Norway, however, after the tensions decreased, a new playing field 
emerged. Norway realised this and wanted to take advantage. Norway was then, and 
still is, in a position with a rather large range of means as well as a good number of 
organisations with international connections and co operational relationships. “An old 
system is gone and, although it is easy to identify what has changed, it is not yet clear 
that a new system has taken its place. Old patterns have come unstuck, and if new 
patterns are emerging, it is still too soon to define them clearly”3 the Committee on 
International Conflict Resolution stated in 2000.                                                                                                                                      
Democratisation, increased globalisation of economic power and information as well 
as the increased joint efforts of international cooperation with regards to security 
policy and cross boarder efforts to stop crime and violence is emerging, and with these 
changes come new ways in which governments, as well as other actors, try to set 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Comittee on International ConflictResulution (2000) “Conflict Resulution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in 
Stern, P. et al.( Eds) : International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War. Washington DC: National 
Academic Press. p.5.  
2 Strømmen, Wegger Ch. Interviewed by phone. 05.04.2012. 
3 Committee on International Conflict Resolution (2000) “Conflict Resolution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in 
Stern, P. et al.( Eds) : International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War. Washington DC: National 
Academic Press. p.1.  
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limits to violence.4 A new system has given room for new actors and new 
manoeuvres.   
It is imperative that the trust between the warring parties are as good as immaculate 
for any state to gain access to a third part role. To find this balance can be challenging, 
Terje Rød-Larsen describes with the following example. “What is important is to have 
a balanced relationship to the conflict. This can be very hard, because sometimes you 
have to take very strong positions. For example in Libya, Norway didn’t just turn 
against Gadaffi, but also sent the Norwegian Air Force as part of the NATO 
campaign. By doing that we took a stand. Although Norway ran a secret channel with 
Gadaffi during that war, it is incredibly hard to be balanced, even with the 
advantages.”5  
During the 1980`s it was felt, by the foreign ministerial elite, that Norway did not 
have the mentality, expertise, nor tradition to have any international effect. However, 
after the end of the 1990`s, the Norwegian media, as well as politicians, claimed that 
Norway had become a land of peace and a great humanitarian power.6 So what 
changed? 
 
1.2 The Oslo process; breakthrough and a defining moment for Norway 
In 1993 Norway did something that no other country had managed to do, they got the 
two parts of the Gaza conflict together for talks. Although unique, many including 
former Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg has stated that the Oslo Process was a 
declaration of principles, not a final peace agreement, and that this declaration was not 
strong enough to withhold two generations worth of hatred and hostilities.7 He also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Committee on International Conflict Resulution (2000) “Conflict Resulution in a Changing World”, Chap. 1 in 
Stern, P. et al.( Eds) : International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War. Washington DC: National 
Academic Press. p.1. 
5 Larsen, Terje Rød. Interviewed by phone. 12.04.2012. 
6 Tvedt, Terje (2003). Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk 
Forlag AS. p. 41.  
7 Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). Det handler om mennesker. Gjøvik: Gyldendal Norske Forlag AS. p. 274.  
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said that the Oslo Process did not survive the reality it was created for.8                                                     
The Oslo Process was a “unique-a quasi-official process in which political authorities 
in the end, endorsed and adapted their work.”9 Their work was memorable, however it 
was a very special situation that probably will never occur again. The Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) needed a friendly country, which also was trusted by 
Israel, Norway was one of the very few states that matched these criteria.10  Norway`s 
good relationship with the United States made it even more attractive.11 The parties 
wanted Norway because it was a trusted and respected facilitator that would provide 
all their necessities as well as not have any control over the parties.  
However, not everyone was equally content with Norway`s peace negotiation policies. 
Øyvind Østerud has claimed that “Norway`s idealist intentions are not matched by 
achievements in terms of lasting peace”12, he cites the Middle East and Sri Lanka as 
examples. “Interventions for peace have rarely been successful and tend to ignore the 
fact that institutional conditions for peace and democratic stability have emerged- 
where we find these-through complex and long-term historic processes. Both the 
dilemmas involved and the often unintended and negative consequences of peace 
interventions tend to disappear in the rhetoric of the Norwegian engagement policy.”13 
Many others, among them Terje Tvedt are critical to Norway`s role and share 
Østerud`s views. 
In the 1992 White Paper on Norwegian development aid, Norway is not considered as 
having particular tradition or competence for peace promotion.14 Peace promotion was 
put under the headings of democracy promotion and humanitarian assistance, and was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2001). Det handler om mennesker. Gjøvik: Gyldendal Norske Forlag AS. p. 274.  
9 Saunders, Harold  (2000) “Interactive conflict resolution: A review for Policy Makers in Making and Building 
Peace”, Chap. 7 in Stern, P. et al.( Eds) : International Conflict Resolutions after the Cold War. Washington 
DC: National Academic Press. p.255.  
10 Fixdal, Mona (2013, forthcoming) Ways out of War: Peacemakers in the Middle East and Balkans. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ch. 5, p. 8.  
11 i.b.i.d. 
12 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NORAD. p. 17.	  
13 i.b.i.d.	  
14 Skånland, Øystein Haga (2011) “Peace promotion as National identity: The emergence and Reproduction of 
Norway`s Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts.” Page 1-22. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference, 
Reykjavik, Iceland. p.9. 
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hardly mentioned during the Parliamentary debate over the White Paper.15                  
However, after the “Oslo Process” in 1993, Norway was seen more as an international 
player. It was shocking to many that a small country like Norway managed to do what 
a super power like the United States did not. As well as having opportunity, Norway 
also has the will to engage in international conflict resolutions. Most governments 
want to be involved in international peace negations if they think it can promote their 
image and co operational relationships, and Norway is no different. It was included as 
a vague statement in a White Paper until after Norway`s involvement in the “Oslo 
Process”. The engagement put international peace negotiations firmly on Norway`s 
foreign policy agenda. To begin with it was an untraditional way of thinking about 
Norway,16 but after the “short-lived” successes of the Oslo Process, Norway was 
thrown into the international spotlight and quickly gained a reputation for being a 
skilled international peace negotiator. Negotiation efforts in the Middle East, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Cyprus, Mali, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Haiti, as well as peace-
promoting work in Europe and Eurasia through the OSCE, are all included in 
Norway`s peace portfolio.17 Since 1993, a wide range of other practices such as 
humanitarian assistance, development aid and support for the UN peace efforts have 
been linked to the Norwegian peace promotion image. As a result of the Oslo Process, 
scholars were able to give Norway a “scientific” verification of the self image, or 
some would say myth of self image, and the process is still today largely attached to 
the representation of the Norwegian identity.18                                                                              
Norway saw that its involvement in peace negotiations benefitted the Norwegian 
perception abroad. It opened doors and connected high powered people.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Skånland, Øystein Haga (2011) “Peace promotion as National identity: The emergence and Reproduction of 
Norway`s Activist Peace and Reconciliation Efforts.” Page 1-22. Paper presented at the 2011 ECPR Conference, 
Reykjavik, Iceland. p.9.	  
16Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 17.10.2011. 
17 Skånland, Øystein Haga (2010) “Norway is a peace nation: A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian 
peace engagement.” Page 34-54, in Cooperation and Conflict 45 (1). Sage Publications. p. 37.  
18 Bekken, Sigmund (2007) “Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy.” Page 1- 76. Master 
thesis from Australian National University. p. 56. 
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2. Method; techniques and procedures for gathering 
and analyzing data. 
How to proceed to find the answers needed? What obstacles may arise? Why did I 
choose this type of research?  
As a main source of information collection for this thesis, I have chosen interviews as 
a qualitative research method. This has been done to enable “an inner experience of 
participants”... “and to discover rather than test variables”19. This is important in the 
field of international peace negotiations as personal determination, characteristics and 
contacts are vital for peace negations to take place. Considering my research questions 
they would be hard to answer without using this qualitative method. Qualitative 
research puts much more emphasis on the interview object`s views than in quantitative 
research where the interview is reflecting the researcher`s views.  
The reasons for putting so much emphasis on interviews are many. Firstly, I want to 
know what certain people had to say about specific issues. Norway`s role as a peace 
negotiator has been researched before. However the aim of this thesis is not only to 
find out what profiled Norwegians think of the issue, but also to compare this with 
what professionals in the same sectors abroad think.                                                     
Secondly, I want to have total control over whom I collect information from. Books 
and articles have been used, especially in the methods and theory chapters as they 
require more theory based information. Thirdly, interviews were chosen to achieve a 
more “vibrant and alive” feel to the thesis. The aim has been to create a debate on 
paper.         
I am using semi-structural interviews to give me the room I need to add or subtract 
questions, but also to have enough similarities in the questions so that comparing the 
answers is feasible. Alan Bryman provides the following definition for semi-
structured interviews; “This is a term that covers a wide range of instances. It typically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 12. 
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refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the 
general form of an interview schedule but it is able to vary the sequence of questions.  
The questions are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of reference from 
that typically found in a structured interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually 
has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as significant 
replies.”20 This is the definition I have chosen to follow.  
 I am conducting what is known as factual interviews. The wording of questions asked 
is particularly important here as you are looking for a particular answer. You also 
want the interview objects` true opinion. Explaining the importance of the questions, 
not twisting the wording or questions is central as it may result in a different outcome.                                                                                                                                            
I am comparing my data using constant comparison. Constant comparison is used to 
group together answers to frequent questions and thereby to look at and analyse the 
various perspectives and opinions. The similarities and differences in the data are then 
compared.21 When I am looking through the data I will be looking out for key words 
and phrases that will make comparing, and contrasting, arguments easier.  
 
2.1 Many methodological challenges can be highlighted in this thesis  
The first problem comes when trying to measure or define “successful.” If a peace 
process has broken down or the conflict reassumes, has the peace facilitation then 
failed? What constitutes a failure or a success in international peace negotiations? Are 
the standards maybe too high, too optimistic? Long term vs. short term peace also 
needs to be taken into account. It is therefore hard to determine how many successes 
and failures Norway, and other nations, have had in the field of peace negotiations.  
Another issue is what to measure Norway against. Size? If so, with or without sea 
areas? Population? Wealth? When many of the interview objects talk about Norway as 
a small state, they often mean in terms of land size and population.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Bryman, Alan (2008) Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press. p.196. 
21 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 73.  
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The third problem that arises is to get a good answer to the question; “Are we as good 
at peace negotiations as we think we are?” How will you really know the answer to 
this? I have chosen to ask people who are working with peace negotiations on a daily 
basis and/or do/have done research into the topic. These would be the people with the 
most relevant knowledge and will thereby be able to give me the most concrete 
answer.                                                                                                                                           
The forth methodological challenge will be that Norwegian literature and interviews 
have been translated by myself. Kvale and Brinkmann mention the ethical issue that 
arises during the transcription phase of an interview. They emphasise how important it 
is that “a transcribed text is loyal to the interviewee’s oral statements.”22 One of the 
reasons I have chosen to categorize my interview objects, is to overcome this 
challenge. By doing so I disconnect the argument from some of the specific persons 
who wish to stay anonymous, and eliminate the risk of someone being perceived in an 
unfortunate light. Many of the quotations are, however, connected to the interview 
object due to the interview objects` current profession or past careers. All the useful 
and relevant parts of the interviews have been transcribed and can be seen upon 
request. A variable must be directly observable to be used. This is the reason I have 
chosen to only include the relevant and useful parts of the interviews in the transcripts, 
leaving the internal and to a larger extent, the external validity, which refers to 
relevance, high. I found that transcribing all the interviews myself has helped me to 
process as well as familiarize myself with the data. Being aware of the fact that when 
you use quotes from interviews you are at risk of taking the quotes out of context and 
thereby slightly change their meaning.23 This is something I have been very cautious 
to prevent.                                                                                                                                       
The fifth problem that may arise is related to the fact that failures are reported less 
frequently than success stories. This raise questions about to what degree it is possible 
to trust the information received with regards to peace processes. Secrecy is widely 
used as a tool to make parties more willing to come together and attempt negotiations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kvale, Steinar and Birinkmann, Svend (2009) Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 63.  
23 Bryman, Alan (2008) Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 553. 	  
	  	  
12	  
Another challenge I will face is that many of my interview objects have limitations to 
what they can say on record. The more distinguished interview object, the more 
involved they have been in peace negotiations and the more knowledge they possess, 
but the less open and straight talking they may be able to be.                                                                                                
Sixth, I noticed that few of the interviews lasted for more than 40 minutes, and I also 
became aware of that many of the interview object work under a lot of stress and that 
this is something I must be aware of and take into consideration. This Kvale and 
Brinkmann called the interview situation24.                                                                               
The seventh issue contains the challenge when Norway cooperates with other states 
and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the negotiations. It will then be hard 
to separate efforts and result for each participant. 25 It would be very hard, if not 
impossible to prove whether a different strategy would produce a different result, this 
is known as the conceptual problem of counterfactual history. The Fundamental 
Problem of Casuals Inference, Gary King at al. discus. In their article they state that 
we cannot rerun history to see whether changing the dependant variable would have 
any effect on the independent variable in a given scenario.26 It would be impossible 
always to know exactly what went wrong or right in a given negotiation, and who 
caused this effect.  It is important to keep in mind that history will never repeat itself 
when you attempt to compare historical events. Roger Bullen stated that “(H) history 
is what historians write; the past is something different.”27 We will never be able to 
fully grasp or understand the past as it truly was because the interview objects’ views 
will be colored by different experiences.                                                                             
The eighth problem I will face is that a researcher brings all his/her own knowledge, 
views, experiences, as well as biases into all aspects of a thesis.28 This has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Kvale, Steinar and Birinkmann, Svend (2009) Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 63.  
25 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NORAD. p. 66.  
26 King , Gary et al. (1994) “Increasing the Number of Observations.”. Page 208-230. In Designing Social 
Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. p. 208.  
27 PECOS 4020: Lecture  # 6 with Olav Njølstad, “Methodological issues in archive research”. 15.09.2010. 
28 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 32. 
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impossible to avoid in my case. As a master student, my knowledge of this field is far 
more limited than of those I have interviewed. This limited knowledge may also be 
reflected on the questions asked, perhaps making the questions not as fruitful or to the 
point as they might have been if I had more experience and knowledge.                                      
The ninth challenge is to refrain from asking leading questions. However, in cases 
where information is being withheld a leading question may help you on the right 
track. A follow-up question is not necessarily as “forceful”, but this might also 
influence the interview object to take different turns.                                                            
Finally, it has proven easier to obtain Norwegian interview objects than it has been to 
get foreign experts` opinions. It is very important to the thesis that the different 
Norwegians views are well represented so that there is something to compare others` 
comments to, however I believe it would have given an even better insight into this 
issue if a few more critical views from abroad had been granted.  
 
2.2 Evaluation approach   
To attempt to combat some of the challenges highlighted above I have taken the 
following measures: I have interviewed a very wide range of people to get a large 
sample and thereby a result that is as correct as possible. I have tried to interview 
people in the similar or same political positions in Norway and abroad, ensuring that a 
comparison would be as credible as possible. This also goes for NGO workers and 
researchers. The Norwegian media has been included to hopefully get a view from 
outside the interconnected web of Norwegian politicians, researchers and NGO 
employees. I have conducted interviews with Norwegian foreign correspondents to 
attempt to get a more truthful idea of how Norwegians think about themselves when it 
comes to peace negotiating. The journalists are generally more outspoken and honest 
about their opinions in addition to the fact that they do not have to defend any parts of 
the Norwegian policies. By using a qualitative research method with semi-structured 
interviews I will find factual as well as emotional information which will help me to 
paint a fuller picture of events from multiple angles.  
	  	  
14	  
 As pointed out by Corbin and Strauss, the important thing is the quality of your 
research material that is to be analysed.29 However, it is also important to try to cover 
the whole spectre of opinions. This is done by finding the negative case. The negative 
case is an exception to the patterns unfolding in your research.30                                                   
I have chosen the definition of “success” that is used in the 2010 “Pawns of Peace: 
Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009” report by NORAD. 
It states that success in peace building terms “must ultimately involve shifts in the 
structural determination of the conflict.”31                                                                                           
Another measure I have taken is to ensure the limitation of biast views. To do this it is 
important to focus on sensitivity. Sensitivity means “having insight, being tuned in to, 
being able to pick up on relative issues, events, and any happenings in data.”32                                                                                           
Ethically there can be many pitfalls when it comes to semi-structured interviews. This 
became even more evident as I did a large number of interviews over the phone. Not 
having face to face interaction limits the ability to interpret answers, register facial 
expressions etc, even though body language is not regarded as a reliable source. 
However, by not doing personal interviews you eliminate the risk of the respondent’s 
answers being affected by characteristics of the interviewer. Alan Bryman discusses 
this and points to characteristics such as class and ethnicity, as well as the fact that 
interview objects sometimes answer questions in certain ways to satisfy the 
interviewer.33 This is limited with phone interviews. Phone interviews also make it 
easier to use notes or check up on information during the interview. Kvale and 
Brinkmann also discuss the issues that interviewing elites may bring. They mention 
the fact that these people are very used to being interviewed and will often have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 27.  
30 i.b.i.d. p. 84.  
31 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NORAD. p. 10.  
32 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 32. 
33 Bryman, Alan (2008) Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 198. 
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developed “talk tracks”34. As I have spoken to people on more than once, I noticed 
this pattern of “pre-conducted answers” to certain questions, as well as recognizing 
some statements from books and articles. This is hard for an interviewer to eliminate, 
but where it was possible I tried to ask follow-up, more explorative and more 
challenging questions.                                                                                                             
While on the topic of ethics, I should point out that all the interviews have been 
recorded with permission from the interview objects, informed consent has always 
been given. Some stated that they do not want to be quoted on certain statements 
which of course have been respected together with confidentiality.                                          
Another problem-eliminating initiative has to do with the difficulty of getting persons 
of a certain position to answer certain questions. To overcome this problem I have 
aimed to interview people who have been involved in negotiations, but not at the 
highest level, as well as researchers in the same field. I have written an interview 
guide to help me in my research, as well as to organize my work. The interview guide 
should not include questions that are too specific.   
To combat certain problems another measure taken is to divide the interview objects 
into groups. E.g. Norwegian foreign correspondents, foreign NGO workers and so on. 
This has been done to maximize the clarity and consistency in my research. This 
includes breaking information down into sub groups so that within group comparison 
is made easier. This also allows us to talk about a degree of explained variance. This 
variance describes how much x, y, and z explains when looking at a, as well as 
allowing us to look at the interaction effects. This is what I aim to accomplish when 
dividing the interview objects into different categories. It is important to note that a 
correlation does not automatically mean an explanation. A does not have to be cause 
B, or C, or D etc. It is important to have both correlations as well as mechanisms to 
have a theory. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Kvale, Steinar and Birinkmann, Svend (2009) Interviews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. California, USA: Sage Publications Inc. p. 147. 
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2.3 The reasons for focusing on some chosen countries   
I have contacted people from Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, France and Canada 
because these are all countries that have been categorized together with Norway on 
many relevant occasions. They are all countries that have been involved in peace 
negotiations, and house good research institutions in this field. I have also attempted 
to included interview objects from the United States as I wanted to find out what a 
superpower thinks of Norway`s peace negotiation efforts.  
The main departure from the original research design is the non inclusion of “the 
Norwegian model.” To start with the “Norwegian model” was going to be a central 
theme in the thesis, however, after much research it has become clear that only a 
minute selection of people actually believe that this model exists. More information 
on this can be found in the Methods chapter.   
 
2.4 Sources: This thesis has been developed with the following 
combination of sources 
Interviews:  
I am using qualitative research methods, basing a large part of my research on 
interviews. I have aimed at getting a large number of high profiled experts in this 
field. Some interviewed experts have led me to others. The interviews have been 
conducted face- to- face, by phone, email and letters. The Norwegian interview 
objects have been interviewed in Norwegian, whilst the others have been interviewed 
in English. I have myself translated and transcribed all the interviews where this has 
been necessary.  
Primary written sources:  
I have used a large number of books and articles published on this subject. Many of 
the authors have later become interview objects.  I have not applied to get access to 
any databases that the University of Oslo does not already grant me access to.   
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Unpublished works:   
I have been able to read through and use Mona Fixdal`s unpublished work on peace 
negotiations.  This book is going to be published in 2013 by Palgrave Macmillan. 
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3. Theory: Qualitative analysis: “A process of examining and 
interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and 
develop empirical knowledge”.35  
It is important to note that academic knowledge and actual negotiation practice are 
two very different things.  To have the academic tools and knowledge about 
techniques etc. is all well and good, however, every conflict is unique and it is the 
underlying issues and local history in every conflict that are key areas to understand 
and master.  
I was planning on supporting my arguments with a theoretical framework; “The 
Norwegian Model” and use this as a basis for my research. This model describes the 
characteristics of the “Norwegian way” of doing international peace negotiations.  By 
its founders the “Norwegian model” is presented as a co-existence between NGOs, the 
state, research institutions and organizations which represent the civil society, 
however in reality, “many of these large organizations are lead by stately paid 
bureaucrats and politicians.”36 As the research has progressed it has become clear that 
not many believe in the existence of a so called “Norwegian model”. This goes for 
Norwegians as well as foreigners. Most of the interview objects concur that Norway 
has certain traits when it comes to peace negotiations, such as openness, fairness, time 
and financial resources, but as all conflicts are so vastly different it is impossible to 
call something a Norwegian model as Norway has to adapt as a facilitator in any given 
situation. There has been no grand plan or template followed in any of the peace 
negotiations Norway has been involved in. Rather it has been a case of the right 
people at the right time as Jan Egeland has stated.37  
Other common traits that reoccurs in Norway`s approach to peace negotiations are the 
use of soft power trough facilitation and dialogue, backchannel support provided by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Corbin, Juliet and Strauss, Anselm (2008) Basics of Qualitative Research 3e. California, USA: Sage 
Publications Inc. p. 1 
36 Tvedt, Terje (2003). Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen. Oslo. Gyldendal Norsk 
Forlag AS. p. 227.  
37 Egeland, Jan. Interviewed by phone. 17.10.2011. 
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various NGOs, ownership by opposing parties, a relative wide agreement on domestic 
politics, as well as informality and flexibility.38 The close ties that link the NGOs, 
government and the academic and research institutions together can also be seen as 
something negative. This interlinked bond of cooperation can result in an uncritical 
and biast system that is “marked by elite circulation and vested interests.”39 Talking 
on an equal basis to both sides of the conflict has been a Norwegian trademark, but 
this has become harder to follow after 9/11 as talking to blacklisted non-state military 
actors is seen to be a thing of the past.40 As Vidar Helgesen (2007) points out, 
Norway`s “peace diplomacy has been caught between anti terror policies that it cannot 
influence and peace diplomacy ambitions that it cannot live up to,”41 furthermore, he 
claims “Norway struggles to square the circle of being a loyal team player, helping to 
demonstrate a united international front against terrorism, and at the same time 
wanting to support negotiated solutions to conflict in which one side is labelled a 
terrorist organisation.”42  
The Norwegian traits may be useful when it comes to bringing the actors to the 
negotiation table, however a more powerful actor is often needed to implement a final 
agreement. The limitations of Norway`s influence and power in this field might not be 
clear to the Norwegian public as this is not spoken of to a large degree outside the 
inner circle of negotiators.  
 
3.1 Constructivist literature discusses the collective identity:  
Who are we?  
How do Norwegians view themselves? What role(s) do they actually play when 
involved in peace negotiations? “Identity with its appropriate attachments of 
psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NORAD. p. 4.  
39 i.b.i.d. p. 17.  
40 i.b.i.d. p. 75.  
41 i.b.i.d. p. 80.  
42 i.b.i.d  
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world,”43 Peter Berger argues. Alexander Wendt states that just as people have 
different identities which are correlated to institutional roles e.g. as son, teacher and 
citizen, a state may also have multiple identities like imperial power and sovereign.44  
The failure of specified roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult, 
and identity confusion may arise.45   
In the Sri Lanka peace negotiations, Norway played the role of peace facilitator, aid 
donor as well as ceasefire monitor.46 Alexander Wendt claims that the “(P) process of 
identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation 
or “security” of the self.”47 With international peace negotiations Norway lifts its 
identity and gets more involved on the international arena. This makes Norway a more 
valuable player and increases its security. “Small powers do not have the luxury of 
relying on national means and may therefore learn faster that collective recognition is 
a cornerstone for security.”48  Norway has played many different roles in different 
conflicts. In Sri Lanka, Norway had the role as a sole facilitator, whilst during the 
post-election violence in Kenya, Norway took a supportive role, strengthening the 
efforts of others.49 As mentioned before, the roles of a facilitator are vast.  
 
3.2 Definition of negotiation: basic concepts in the field of  
peace negotiations 
A peace agreement is not only present or none present, there are many shades of gray 
to this concept. If a peace agreement is negotiated and signed, its effectiveness, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Wendt, Alexander (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. 
Page 391-425, in International Organization, Vol. 46, No 2. p. 397/398. 
44i.b.i.d. p. 398. 
45 i.b.i.d.. p. 398/399. 
46 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NORAD. p. xv.  
47 Wendt, Alexander (1992) “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics”. 
Page 391-425, in International Organization, Vol. 46, No 2. p. 399.  
48 i.b.i.d. p. 415.	  
49 Sørbø, Gunnar et al. (2011) Pawns of Peace: Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009. 
NOR AD. p. 13. 
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distribution of benefits as well as its stability will all be important aspects to look at50. 
If none of these are accomplished, have they moved in a more positive direction 
during the negotiations? Fred Charles Ikle defines negotiations as “a process in which 
explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement 
on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest where conflicting interests 
are present.”51 Actors will only enter into negotiations when and if there are no other 
ways for them to obtain what they want, it is an option when no other options are 
available.  However, it also needs to be the best way to handle the situation from the 
point of view of the involved parties.                                                                                               
Propositions are needed for the negotiations to get started, a negotiation would not 
start unless the parties involved believe that there is a settlement range present.  A 
settlement range is a range of solutions that both parties consider better than the 
starting point.  The common reference point is the Best Alternative To a Negotiated 
Agreement (BATNA), and a negotiation set is a range of alternatives in the settlement 
range that are considered to be Pareto optimal. A states` resistance point is what can 
be achieved by a state without cooperation/negotiations with others. 
Norway acts, mostly, as a third party intervener in peace negotiations.  The rational 
choice assumption claims that states involved do not only care about their personal 
gain. The pay-offs other states achieve also matters. But the questions are when and to 
what extent will governments take other states` pay-offs into account?52 Here you 
commonly see two different, mutually compatible traits, drawn from the same 
fundamental concern.53 Defensive competitiveness is when a state is attempting to 
maximize their own gain relative to the adversary`s gains, and constraining altruism is 
the focus on not losing, instead of “winning”.54 This is a used strategy for Norway.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Hopmann, P. Terrence (1996) The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts. South 
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press. p. 28-30.  
51 i.b.i.d. p. 25.  
52 Underdal, Arild (1992) “Designing Politically Feasible Solutions”. Page 221-254, in (Ed) Malnes, Raino; et 
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However, for a negotiation to get started you need ripeness. Ripeness is mostly a 
result from a mutually hurting stalemate where both or all parties recognise that they 
are at “the point where they can no longer escalate their way to victory and the sunk 
costs plus the countering efforts of the other side makes for a costly deadlock,”55 
Zartman (1996) stated.                                                                                                                        
Norway is focused on being a “peace aider” not a “peace creator”56 according to the 
Foreign Ministry. A conflict has to be ripe for negotiations to take place, this means 
that all parties to the conflict believe in the possibility of finding an agreement that all 
can accept. If the parties in the conflict have not created the state of ripeness, aiding 
the creating of peace is impossible. Norway needs to be invited to play a role in the 
negotiations by all parties involved, and all parties have to agree that Norway is a 
wanted facilitator for their situation.  It is not so that Norway can decide to intervene 
on its own.  
 
3.3 What are the different varieties of third party engagement?  What 
types of strategies can a third party intervener use?   
A facilitator is involved at a minimum level. There are many different aspects of a 
negotiation that needs different kinds of facilitators. One such type is the process 
facilitator. Here the facilitator will attempt to create conditions that are needed to 
reach an agreement, these conditions are often referred to as the provision of good 
offices. The venues where the negotiations take place as well as all the logistical 
arrangements around the negotiations are all important tasks that fall to the facilitator. 
A facilitator may also help the negotiating parties improve communication, set the 
agenda e.g. by deciding on easier issues to be discussed first,57 as well as finding facts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Pruitt, Dean G. (1997) “Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks.” Page 237-250, in International Negotiations 2 
(2). Kluwer Law International. p. 237.  
56 The Norwegian Foreign Ministry website; Fred og forsoning: Den norske modellen.  (accessed 03.04.12) 
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and clarify issues when needed. The second role of a facilitator is the facilitator of 
communication, meetings and compromises.58 During negotiations parties will be vary 
of who makes the first concession and who makes the first and firmest commitments. 
The facilitator`s role here is to “facilitate mutual and simultaneous flexibility” 59 as 
well as trying to ensure that one party does not try to exploit the others` concessions. 
A way of doing so is to communicate concessions from one party to another like it is 
the facilitators’ idea, this may make the proposals easier to accept and also help to 
save face.60                                                                                                                                           
The third facilitator role is the facilitator of cognitive change61. Sometimes helping a 
party to see an issue in a new light can help them to change their viewpoint.  This 
form of facilitation is used mostly in cases where “stalemate seems to be caused more 
by different perspectives of the same issues, misunderstandings, or other 
psychological or personality factors, rather than by conflict of interest.”62  This type of 
mediation is often referred to as conciliation. Here the facilitator will try to adjust the 
parties` view of each other by clarification and comparisons.63 Ideally the situation 
should be seen as integrative bargaining, where the opponent are looking to find a 
common solution together, rather than distributive bargaining where the opponents 
basic goals are in conflict with each other, and the primary focus is on your own 
maximization of utilities. If an atmosphere of integrative bargaining is achieved, it is 
easier to find common ground. Both facilitation and formulation are considered 
integrative strategies as they help the opponents find alternatives that work for all 
parties involved.64 As Norway does not have any hard power to either threaten or 
force an outcome, integrative bargaining is a much desired tactic. It is important to try 
to see the disagreements from your opponent`s point of view, however, doing this you 
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may risk that your domestic audience feels like you are “selling out to the enemy”.65 
Another benefit to the facilitation role is the use of an incremental approach. This 
approach focuses on minor issues first and leaves more difficult issues till the end 
after other things are already agreed on. This is seen clearly in the Oslo Process.                                                                                                                                              
A second role a mediator can take is as a formulator, this is someone who will help the 
parties come up with different and new solutions to their problems,66 within the limits 
set by party interests.  The degree of direct involvement is larger here than with a 
facilitator. The mediator as a formulator helps the two parties help themselves, by 
tactful, sympathetic, accurate, straightforward prodding and suggestions.”67  
A manipulator is the most forceful of all types of negotiators. A manipulator will use 
his/ her power attempting to bend the outcome in their wanted direction. They can 
sometimes be so involved that they can be seen as another party to the negotiations 
instead of the third party negotiator. The manipulator tries to control many aspects of 
the negotiations that the facilitator and the formulator will not be able to influence. 
They will try to be in charge of when certain concessions are made, moving the 
negotiation in the direction they want, control what information is available to whom, 
as well as try to manipulate the international atmosphere so that it may have an effect 
on the outcome.68 Beardsley et al. claim that all three styles are intertwined. To be a 
manipulator you need facilitation to bring the parties together, and formulation to 
structure proposals, he claims.69  
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3.3.1 Which conditions need to be in place for the use of these 
strategies?  
For a facilitator to be effective you need very skilled, knowledgeable and professional 
individuals. These people have to be able to develop an atmosphere of cooperation 
and a shared wish to find a common solution.70 It is important to be able to make the 
other part out to be just as human as you are and also to create a safe atmosphere to 
work in. Keeping a negotiation secret is one way of minimizing pressure and the fear 
of failing and thereby making matters even worse for the parties involved. A great 
deal of power is not necessary here, but a good amount of resources is key. A 
facilitator does not have a direct say in the matters discussed and will help the parties 
to find common ground rather than to force an outcome.      
The formulator must have more power to convince the parties than a facilitator. He or 
she must have the ability to influence and manipulate the outcome of the negotiations. 
They become an “advocate for a specific solution, and tries to persuade the parties in 
noncoercive ways to accept the proposed solution. Furthermore, the formulator is no 
longer concerned solely or primarily with the process of negotiation; rather he or she 
plays a role here in responding to the content of the negotiations and shaping the 
substance of the eventual agreement.”71 Often a formulator has its own desired 
outcome of the negotiations.                                         
The manipulator will be required to use force and “introduce resources of power, 
influence, and persuasion that can be brought to bear on the parties to move them to 
agreement. This is a role that can only be played by a powerful mediator, and is more 
likely to be played by a partisan mediator or one who has an interest at stake in the 
outcome of the negotiations.”72 For this role you need hard power, leverage as well as 
support from other players.   Norway may have the support from others, but it lacks 
hard power and leverage over others.  
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3.3.2 What is needed for a peace agreement to be signed, and what is 
needed for long term tension reduction?  
When facilitation is used, parties have, in theory, been able to work out the peace 
agreement between themselves, with some added help and guidance from the 
facilitator. As the disagreeing parties have stood for the large majority of the 
negotiations and been very active in the solution finding, the agreement if reached, has 
the best chance of endurance and non-reoccurrence compared to a formulated or 
manipulated agreement. A facilitated peace agreement will reduce post crisis tensions 
and be the easiest to commit to due to the parties` heavy involvement.73 However, the 
facilitation approach can be unsuccessful when it comes to dealing the asymmetric 
power balance between two, or more, parties.  
“Facilitation and formulation lend themselves best to reducing long-term tension 
reductions among crisis actors. Information revelation helps bring the perceived set of 
options that are preferable to fighting in line with the actual set of options that would 
be realized under complete information.”74  Furthermore, Beardsley et al. writes that 
“(B) by contrast, manipulation only alters relative costs of conflict and deflates each 
party`s reservation point. Such a strategy is likely to have a lesser effect on tension 
reduction because it does not necessarily lead to an outcome that is in line with the 
true distribution of capabilities.”75                                                                                                                                      
“The proposed logic that links facilitation and formulation to tension reduction also 
contributes to a deeper understanding of commitment problems. Commitment and 
informational problems are not mutually exclusive, and we expect that uncertainty 
will make agreements difficult to both reach and implement.  
When formulation is used, tension reduction is lower than with no peace negotiations 
at all.76 During a formulation approach the parties does not get very involved in the 
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negotiations, and this may lead to an uninterest and a wish to go back to a pre 
negotiation status.77 Manipulation may give the fastest results, but as it is not a 
procedure that takes time to look at root causes, tension reduction can be minimal. 
Peace agreements that have been negotiated by a manipulator will usually have a short 
term effect, as the underlying causes of the hostilities have not been dealt with. 
Werner and Yuen found that “conflicts in which the disputants are pressured into an 
agreement will be less stable after settlement than other conflicts.”78                                          
Manipulation can be the most effective style of negotiations to secure a formal 
agreement, and conflicts where formulation is either the most important or the highest 
negotiation style are more likely to end in a formal agreement than conflicts that are 
not mediated or that have used facilitation is the most important or the highest 
negotiation style.79 “Facilitation only has a statistically significant effect on formal 
agreement when it is the most crucial mediation style.”80 However, it is vital to 
remember that these figures are with regards to signing an agreement or not, and does 
not take into account how long the agreement lasted or if the tensions surrounding the 
conflict has been reduces. A manipulation style negotiation can be good for avoiding 
bargaining failures with the use of threats and promises as well as expanding the set of 
alternative solutions; however, it is not the best approach when it comes to achieving 
post-crisis tension reduction.81 
Tension reduction is higher after a negotiation than it would have been if the conflict 
was not negotiated and a peace settlement would not have been attempted.82 As 
expected, Beardsley at al. finds that conflicts that are part of a prolonged disagreement 
are less likely to reach tension reductions than conflict that have not been present that 
long.83 If a crisis is mediated the chance of reaching a formal agreement, according to 
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Beardsley et al. is 48.28%, however, if not mediated, there is only a 7.25% chance of 
reaching a formal agreement.84                                                                                             
Mixing the three different negotiation styles will allow for a better result, and it is 
important to note that formulation and manipulation are almost always used in 
combinations with other, less invasive mediation methods.85 
 
3.3.3. What can be expected from Norway according to the above facts?  
Norway is a facilitator by nature. The weakness with the facilitator role is that there is 
not much power in the implementation phase. Habeeb discusses the importance of 
power and stresses that power is not only measured in military capabilities.86 
Tawney`s definition of power is as follows; “the perceived capability of one side to 
produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of 
resources.”87 Power “is the process by which actor A causes actor B to change his 
behaviour.”88 For this to be possible a state needs to be able to influence another state 
to a very high degree. They need to be forceful in their approach and they must to a 
certain degree be either feared or deeply respected. However, Norway does not have 
any of these types of power. Norway acts as a facilitator in most international peace 
negotiations for this reason. Norway is an affluent country and funds are also easily 
distributed, which makes for a fast reaction. With the excess of funds the country has, 
together with the very low level of internal conflict, it is easier for Norway than for 
many other states, to spend money on getting involved in different conflict resolutions 
beyond their own boarders.  
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Power, according to Habeeb is a three-dimensional concept. Aggregated structural 
power is the total of an actor’s capabilities and resources89 as well as position. It 
includes such national resources as military capabilities, economic positioning and 
demographics vs. the external environment.90 Norway is a state without much 
aggregated power, although the country has a good sized economy, its military 
capabilities and its ability to convince, influence or threaten another state is not strong, 
some even claim nonexistent. Issue-specific structural power is about a country`s 
capabilities and resources vs. another actors` when it comes to a specific issue.91 
Control is a key component here. Here Norway can have some advantages in certain 
situations. These advantages may be a previously established political relationship, or 
more common, that NGOs have established a connection with the local community 
and maybe worked with issues related to the conflict over an extended period of time. 
Trust is the key here. If a Norwegian NGO has played their cards right, a party, or 
multiple parties, in a conflict may trust them, but if the work is seen as biast this may 
affect the Norwegian presence very negative. An example of this is from Sri Lanka. 
Norway was blamed for being more supportive of one side in the conflict and 
therefore many became very sceptical. Norway does not have the power to scare or 
threaten parties, however, in some cases, if the negotiators are being truly trusted; it 
can be possible to have some influence.  As a facilitator with large financial freedom, 
Norway can easily provide certain conditions that may make the negotiations easier or 
more comfortable for the parties involved. 
One of Norway`s biggest “successes” in international peace negotiations is the Oslo 
Process. Some key factors were in place both before and during the negotiations, that 
helped ensure the result, for as long as it lasted. There was motivational ripeness from 
both sides, prior to the start of the negotiations and as well as this they both had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 William Mark (1988) “Ch. 7: Conclusions: Findings and Implications.” Page 129-146, in Power and 
Techniques in International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations. John Hopkins 
University Press. p. 129.  
90 Habeeb, William Mark (1988) “Ch. 2: Power and Negotiations.” Page 10-26, in Power and Techniques in 
International Negotiations, How Weak Nations Bargain With Strong Nations. John Hopkins University Press. p. 
17.  
91 i.b.i.d. p. 19.  
	  	  
30	  
Hamas as a common enemy, which helped bringing them together.92 Working trust, 
the feeling that both are serious about the negotiations was present, and so was a 
feeling of optimism with regards to finding a common solution.93  
Both sides had provided valid spokesmen that were recognised as such by the 
opposition,94 and as the negotiations commenced and de-escalation on both sides was 
desired, they both brought in a high level spokesman. This is a signal of seriousness 
and it can also increase the working trust.95 As soon as it was deemed appropriate, 
Norway took a back-stage role, allowing the parties to communicate directly.  The 
secrecy that surrounded the negotiation was vital to the outcome, especially as the 
conflict had been going on for so long.96 Secrecy meant fewer interruptions, less 
pressure and the involvement of not more people that needed. “The stronger the 
motivation to achieve de-escalation on both sides, the more effective are small 
countries and the more useful is a good offices approach to third party intervention,”97 
Pruitt states. Norway took a facilitator role in these negotiations where the PLO and 
Mr. Arafat were in charge, whilst in Washington, a manipulation role was taken which 
did not lead to much progress. Norway did decide to leave some issue that were 
considered hard to agree on to later stages in the negotiations, whilst issues such as 
refugees, sovereignty, settlements, boarders and the issue of Jerusalem were not to be 
discussed at all. Hilde Henriksen Waage claims that the Oslo process was not an 
ordinary peace agreement. She says that Peres gave Arafat “a stick which he grasped 
because he was drowning”98, whilst for Arafat “the Oslo Accords was the best 
agreement possible in the worst of circumstances.”99 Even though the power balance 
in the Gaza conflict was asymmetric, Norway had no way of altering this balance.  
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Like Dennis Ross said; “Norway had to embrace the Israeli position. It would be no 
deal otherwise.”100                                                                                                                            
Jan Egeland recalled the end result of the Oslo Process from a different angle; “It was 
the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples themselves, through the visionaries courage of 
their leaders, who made this historic peace agreement. We were the midwives, happy 
to see the baby delivered in the end-safe, sound and beautiful.”101 Hilde Henriksen 
Waage concludes one of her articles with this statement; “...the results that can be 
achieved by a powerless facilitator are no more than the strongest party will allow.”102  
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4. Analysis: Is there anything that can be called “The 
Norwegian Model”?  
PRIO`s Stein Tønnesson, as well as Terje Rød Larsen, claim that the so called 
“Norwegian Model” does not exist and Tønnesson does not know anyone who thinks 
so.103 They both think that it would be impossible to have a “one size fits all” policy 
when it comes to peace negotiations as all conflicts are unique, and the conditions for 
each conflict spans immensely. They compare peace negotiations to a tool box. As 
previously stated, all conflicts are unique and because of this you will have to use 
different approaches and methods each time. Geir Otto Pedersen, who works at the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry claims that the “Norwegian model” is not used as a 
template for peace negotiations in general. “It identifies some characteristics to do 
with Norwegian facilitation, however these characteristics are not necessarily all 
present in our engagements.104 Fellow Foreign Ministry employee Jon Hanssen-Bauer 
says that they try to distance themselves from the term “Norwegian Model”. It has 
become too self-assertive and too based on the Oslo Process and is not used as a 
template.105  Petter Bauck at NORAD says that he still finds it hard to clearly say what 
the “Norwegian Model” is beyond an active cooperation between research institutions, 
civil society organizations, flexibility and the will to allocate funds when needed.    
“To the degree that there exists a “Norwegian Model” it would be that Norway has no 
model”, Kristian Harpviken states.106 He adds that Norway has always been very keen 
to use the opportunity that arises to be able to play a constructive role, this is often 
done through individuals who have been particularly involved in a peace process, like 
diplomats, NGOs, businesses or a Norwegian church leader.107 He also points out that 
this can always result in larger personalities being able to test their dreams, whilst the 
more quiet and reserved type may not get a chance.108 This can be seen in the history 
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of Norwegian peace negotiators, as many of the same names repeat themselves during 
different negotiations. Norway may have a large network of researchers on the subject 
of peace negotiations, but not that many have been physically involved in the 
processes.  
 “Not only the Foreign Ministry, but the entire government and the Labour party are 
very taken with the Norwegian and Nordic “models” as a concept for self – 
legitimacy, and that it is a legitimate attitude. However I do not see it as meaningful to 
do so”109, Vidar Helgesen says. A reason for this may be that the brand “Norwegian 
Model” is easily saleable and may boost foreigners` positive opinion about Norway. 
After all, the politicians working with foreign policies are dependent on their foreign 
colleagues wanting to cooperate with them.                                                                                           
Kristian Harpviken says he speaks “to Norwegian diplomats about this, including 
people who work in the Peace and Reconciliation section at the Foreign Ministry, and 
they are the people who have the “Norwegian Model” in their portfolio. Either they do 
not use the term as all, or they use it in quotes, this they have done for many years. 
But the interesting thing is that the list is still published on their website.”110  
It is believed by many that if there is one thing that can be called the “Norwegian 
Model” it is that there is absolutely no blueprint for how Norway will act in a 
negotiation as all conflicts are different, however, it is desirable that certain ethical 
guidelines are followed at all times.  
Without such a thing as a Norwegian model for peace negotiations, is it possible to 
exemplify the Norwegian way of doing this type of work?  
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4.1 How can Norway`s methods of peace negotiations be characterized? 
Terje Tvedt describes seven characteristics with regards to the Norwegian way of 
doing peace negotiations. First, he points out that humanitarian work is seen as much 
more important in Norway than in any other country, and that the state gives more 
support to these volunteering organizations than any other state.111 He also claims that 
the organizations and the state are much more in agreeance and have a closer bond 
than in many other countries, this is also something that a large number of interview 
objects have mentioned.                                                                                                                                       
The leaders of the NGOs and the state interchange their place of work more frequently 
than in other countries.112  This is a phenomenon disliked by many. Whilst some claim 
that this ensures good cooperation and the sharing of knowledge, others feel it creates 
an inner circle of people who will not be critical of each other.                                                 
Terje Tvedt mentions that it is a typically Norwegian trait that leaders of the NGOs 
have a large amount of freedom to manage the financial contributions they are given 
as the state is liberal in its administration politics.113 This is done to decrease the 
chance of a project being slowed down or halted by bureaucratic processes. This has 
been mentioned by many as something specific for Norway`s way of doing peace 
negotiations.                                                                                                                                   
The financial flexibility is key to the way Norway undertakes this type of politics, but 
just as important as having funds to spend , in the importance of having the ability to 
be able to spend it fast, Kristian Harpviken points out.114 An example is “the 
Norwegian foreign ministry wins over the Swedish every time, because we are faster 
at getting the cheque book out!”115 Although speed is essential in many negotiation 
situations and a long bureaucratic process of obtaining needed funds may ruin an 
opportunity for progress, the projects the money goes to will not be critically 
evaluated and time for a second opinions may not be prioritized. The easy access to 
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funds may cause quick and not thought through decisions that may end with a 
negative result.                                                                                                                                 
Jonas Gahr Støre has pointed out six trademarks in Norway`s way of conducting 
peace negotiations. Firstly, he mentions a broad consensus about the direction foreign 
affairs take, secondly, establishing competence through presence in conflict areas, and 
thirdly, the Foreign Minister mentions the strong cooperation between NGOs, research 
institutions and the government.116 Furthermore, he mentions the will to take risks, 
and fifth, the little personal interest we have in others` territories and the fact that we 
are not biast, and finally our persistent will and ability to handle and create silent 
processes.117  
These characteristics have been mentioned by a large majority of interview objects 
and they are all visible in the way Norway conducts peace negotiations.  The fact that 
there has emerged a general consensus with regards to foreign policy between all 
parties in the Norwegian parliament results in the Norwegian peace engagement being 
motivated by realism and idealism without any particular conflict between the two.118 
E.H. Carr argues that statesmen often are torn between reality and utopia, or realism 
and idealism.119 Henrik Thune describes this phenomenon with the following 
statement; “According to a standard view, popular Norwegian commentators and 
historians, Norway`s foreign relations after World War II are like a pendulum 
swinging from side to side, between national interests and national values, between 
the will to secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global 
cosmopolitan spirituality.”120 This is where the enlarged view many Norwegians have 
of themselves can affect the negotiations. If a larger task is taken on without the 
proper knowledge or experience, on the grounds of someone thinking they are 
capable, a situation may quickly go from bad to worse.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) ”Tilslørt fredspolitikk” Page 379-388, in Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 385.  
117 i.b.i.d 
118 Langmore, John (2011) “Distinctive Features of Norwegian Foreign Policy: Possible Lessons for Australia.” 
Page 1-12. From the Australian Political Science Association Conference 2011. p.1. 
119 Bekken, Sigmund (2007) “Identities and peace promotion in Norwegian foreign policy.” Page 1- 76. Master 
thesis from Australian National University. p. 15. 
120 i.b.i.d	  
	  	  
36	  
NGOs may have better conditions to execute their wishes and what they stand for than 
the government, as a government will have many other responsibilities and priorities, 
whilst NGOs often specialises in one or a few areas. 
A very interesting issue that Thomas Hylland Eriksen pointed out is the fact that a 
Norwegian peace negotiator does not come across as they are leaders of superpower 
with a crisp suit and a limousine, but rather they may arrive in a conflict zone with 
messy hair and sweat stains on their shirt. 121 This is something that makes us appear 
less harmful and more like an average Joe which can be a great advantage when acting 
as a third party in a peace negotiation. The naive optimism and the belief that all 
people are Norwegians, they just do not know it yet is clearly visible. That they are 
corrupt is just because they have not realized that what they are doing is bad, and 
through agreements, campaigns and different measures you can get rid of many of the 
world`s problems. This is all a typically Norwegian idea.122 These are archetypal 
examples of the Norwegian mindset.                                                                                                                           
However, not all are convinced that Norway even has any unique characteristics. 
David Malone (President of International Development Research Center, Canada) 
stated that he could not think of any characteristics unique to Norway.123   
The view described by Hylland Eriksen above it a very typical Norwegian 
characteristic, as is the easy transference of funds, the little interest Norway seem to 
have in other countries, the cross party political agreement on the issue of peace 
negotiation and the down to earth impression they exude. There is also another strong 
characteristic to the Norwegian way of presiding with peace negotiations, this is 
discussed below.  
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4.1.2 “The triangle”  
Norwegian NGOs, research facilities and the government work very closely together. 
This is definitely a specific trait of Norwegian peace politics, and I have chosen to call 
this phenomenon “the triangle”.  
It is regularly seen that the people in top positions “switch hats” and go from one of 
the three to another. The close connection between Norwegian NGOs, research 
institutions and the government is very specific for Norway, and Thorvald Stoltenberg 
says that this is a real strength, and “even though we just passed 5 million people, we 
are a small nation and we cannot afford not to cooperate.”124 The fact that people in 
this triangle swap places he finds brilliant, it makes them all understand each other, he 
points out, and adds that this is something he is proud of.125 The Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said that “You make changes when different actors have 
the safety to cooperate...It creates opportunities to make good by playing on different 
strings.”126 The Foreign Minister states he is very concerned with the individuality of 
the different actors, and adds that he things this debate lives more in the academic 
sphere than it does in real life. “We have to be open about people “changing hats”, 
going from one organization to another, but especially in a small country like Norway, 
this will happen.  The important thing is that people know what you stand for in your 
current position” 127 he adds. 
It is clear that for example in the Oslo Process, the role of NGOs was vital. This is 
clearly described by Terje Rød Larsen. “A characteristic of the Oslo process was that 
an NGO, namely Fafo, organized the negotiations. It was funded, but not organized, 
by the Foreign Ministry. In a bureaucracy it is impossible to conduct secret 
negotiations, over a longer period of time, because of written reports etc. The parties 
involved did not want a state to be present, they wanted research facilities, because of 
the liability.”128  However, this is an exception rather than something that happens 
frequently. Terje Tvedt says that Norway`s success as an international peace 
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125 i.b.i.d  
126 Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012.  
127 i.b.i.d 
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negotiator is very often said to exist due to the very close cooperation between 
academics, the state, and the humanitarian actors. This type of close cooperation is 
very rarely seen anywhere else.129 
Previous Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Hans Brattskar says that “I wouldn’t say it’s 
unique to get input from research facilities about current affairs. It’s very normal for 
example in the USA.”130 When I worked as a peace mediator in the Philippines, I 
worked with foreign research facilities, because not many Norwegian research 
facilities were interested in that area.131 Knut Vollebæk thinks it is positive that 
Norway has the cooperation between NGOs, research institutions and the government, 
in the way that it gives Norway available resources the government otherwise 
wouldn’t have, this he considers very important and fundamental. At the same time he 
thinks it’s important to use research facilities or NGOs as resources, because they can 
go further than a government sometimes can. They do not have to take so many 
considerations into account, when it comes to the formal aspects of the work, as a 
government has to. Because of this Vollebæk is sceptical of too much mixing of the 
government and NGOs.132                                                                                                           
“In the Sri Lanka process, the NGOs were drawn in to the ministry and the 
government, I don’t think that’s very wise. You lose a player that you would normally 
have, a player who could have operated more freely than a government. You need a 
distance to some of these institutions, which is very useful, because it creates 
diversity, and provide us with more instruments to play on.”133 Here again the ability 
to be self-critical can be limited due to the tight cooperation.  
This “triangular” relationship has its benefits in the sharing of knowledge and the 
bond of trust created through cooperation, however, these advantages do not outweigh 
the disadvantages the “triangle” represents. As stated previously, to lose the healthy 
amount of scepticism and that critical voice towards others work is very unfortunate.  
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4.1.3 Norway and the Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
The Norwegian government has a very close relationship with Norwegian NGOs, 
which is a clear characteristic of the Norwegian peace negotiation strategy. Peace is 
not made by governments alone, it is made by the people,134 Harold Saunders states. 
Norwegian NGOs, with the missionary organizations, have been engaged in 
humanitarian causes in other parts of the world since the 1860`s, however, it was not 
until the 1960`s that this type of politics became a part of the Norwegian development 
aid.135 The merging of these two concepts, humanitarian work and development aid, 
helped develop an international consensus with regards to NGOs involvement in both. 
Vidar Helgesen claims that peace negotiation is a very natural extension of Norway`s 
humanitarian engagement. It would be pointless to spend large amounts of money 
fixing the consequences of war without trying to reduce the chance of more conflict 
through peace negotiations, he says.136 Although this is true, it is the level of 
cooperation, dependence and interconnectedness that is unusual and some may claim, 
not always positive. “NGOs are playing a growing role, directly and indirectly, in 
international conflict resolutions only in part because they can make good use of some 
of the less traditional, integrative strategies of conflict resolution. More importantly, 
states are increasingly less willing to run the risks created by strategies to mitigate 
violence. The humanitarian NGOs are at the forefront of those that confront most 
directly the consequences of great power disengagement and privatization in the 
complex humanitarian emergencies that are now considered legitimately as part of 
international conflict.”137 The NGOs may act as buffers at times, however, this is a 
role that is accepted by the NGOs. “The influence of the Norwegian NGOs and the 
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state goes both ways in peace negotiations as it does in many other areas, our 
collaboration and the way we use our funds clearly also influence the NGOs` 
priorities,”138 Geir Otto Pedersen who works at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
claims. 
NGOs such as Human Right Watch, which do not take any funding from governments 
to ensure independence, have through time established trustworthy contacts in 
countries like Egypt, Syria and Libya. When the Arab Spring “kicked off”, the 
contacts were already there and it was made sure that valid information left the 
countries. Mona Juul, who was heavily involved in the negotiation of the Oslo 
Process, said that “(T) the ministry is quite limited when it comes to expertise. We 
have the money, they have the contacts,”139 and by “they” she means the NGOs. The 
Foreign Ministry has on many occasions needed the NGO`s local knowledge, which is 
of vital importance in order to make any sort of real and lasting changes to a conflict. 
Norway prides itself on having good, local knowledge, NGOs presence is therefore 
needed on a regular basis. With the use of NGOs you may be able to connect with the 
local population etc. in a better way, but maybe more important, you gain the 
possibility to blame others for a failure.  
Terje Tvedt states that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry gives large amounts of money 
to humanitarian organizations, and that during the 1960`s there was no major 
difference in the budget and the number of employees at the various NGOs, but today 
about 70% of all the Foreign Ministry`s donations goes to the five largest NGOs. 
(Refugee Council, Norwegian Church Aid, Red Cross, Save the Children and 
Norwegian Peoples Aid.)140 The more independent the government regards an 
organization, the more funds it may get. This very close bond of dependence is 
something many disagree with.  
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Norwegian NGOs are important to Norway, but how are they viewed by the 
international community? Terje Tvedt claims that in many countries it is not the 
Norwegian Ambassador who is seen as the most important, but the employees from 
certain NGOs such as Norwegian People Aid and Norwegian Church Aid. 
Furthermore, evangelists have on more than one occasion received papers from the 
Foreign Ministry stating they are travelling as representatives of the Norwegian 
state.141                                                                                                                                          
As assistance and relief to victims is being privatized in many cases, NGOs face new, 
more complex as well as more dangerous responsibilities.142 Both the NGOs budget 
and workload increase as “privatization of assistance and the withdrawal of states and 
international organizations from the field”143occur more rapidly.  
As the Norwegian state funds these NGOs heavily there is reason to question the 
NGOs` independence from the state.  
 
4.1.4 How important are the Norwegian NGOs to the peace negotiation 
projects? Are they sufficiently independent from the Norwegian state?  
Norwegian NGOs have taken on many different roles throughout the peace 
negotiating history. Like in Guatemala where they were heavily involved, to their 
complementary roles in Eritrea and Ethiopia, and in Sudan where they played a moral 
role, just to mention some. Gro Harlem Brundtland claims that “the degree of 
independence varies with each of these NGOs. It depends on the number of direct 
alliances and direct work programmes they obtain with the Norwegian government. It 
is up to each NGO what profile they choose to adapt.144” It is not so unthinkable that if 
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an NGO assists a governmental mission, they receive some funding from the 
government, however this is not the main concern. The questions arise when a NGO 
gets so intertwined with the Norwegian government`s peace negotiation missions that 
it acts more like a partner than a provider of assistance. The government has no 
responsibility for the NGOs actions or employees, but to outsiders they may act as this 
is the case. This could put the government in tricky positions. The NGOs may also get 
associated with the Norwegian government when they make mistakes. After the 
corruption, bribery and “gin and tonic parties” in connection with refugee camps in Sri 
Lanka, the Norwegian government took a firm stand trying to separate themselves 
from the NGOs...to be a Norwegian in Sri Lanka these days it not exactly a plus.145                                                  
 When Thorvald Stoltenberg was asked whether the close economical ties between the 
government and the NGOs lead to NGOs working more in the government`s direction, 
he answered “yes, but I see no harm in that. I have never seen that the Foreign 
Ministry have been involved in anything that NGOs couldn’t also be a part of.”146 
This criticized contact, however, is also a great strength in the trust that has been 
created, Kristian Harpviken says. He pointed to the fact that the NGOs can always be 
blamed for things that may go wrong in the negotiations.147  
 “Norwegian NGOs are often a political card that the Foreign Ministry can play during 
negotiations. It becomes a type of carrot: If X accepts to demobilise in area Y, the 
Foreign Ministry can guarantee that Norwegian People`s Aid start mine clearance, and 
that the Norwegian Refugee Council build centres for internally displaced persons and 
refugees. This is often important elements of a successful agreement. The large 
Norwegian NGOs put great emphasis on being independent, but due to the fact that 
the Foreign Ministry is one of their main sponsors, it will take much for the NGOs not 
to go along with the Foreign Ministry”, says an interview object who wishes to be 
anonymous.  
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Ambassador Kai Sauer, Vidar Helgesen and others, were asked if the fact that states 
can blame NGOs if something goes wrong is a reason why they are welcomed as 
contributors to the peace negotiations. They answered that this is certainly the case, 
and that it is not a surprise, everyone knows this. “Success has many fathers, and 
failure is usually allotted to one, usually the NGO in this regard,” Kai Sauer adds.148 
“The whole point is that is it a cooperation model, that it is not a relationship with 
tensions, that they are partners.”149 Because the tasks are distributed it makes it an 
easy and cheap way of doing peace negotiations,150 Jan Egeland states. 
Professor Goodhand claims that “It’s clear in the way that Norway funded 
organizations in relation to the Sri Lankan peace process for quite an instrumental 
purpose, and this was related to the belief that NGOs could play in and supporting the 
peace process, building a constituency for peace, creating an economic peace dividend 
and building links between communities on different sides of the conflict.” “If you 
look at the funding trends”,  Dr. Goodhand continues,  “you`ll see a big boost of 
funding to NGOs, but it wasn’t just Norwegian NGOs it was also to a lot of Sri 
Lankan organizations, in particular to FCE” (Foundation for Co-Existence) “and 
Milinda Moragoda`s organization” (Institute for Peoples' Empowerment (MMIPE)) 
“an anti landmine, clearance organization.”151  
Not all governmental cooperation with NGOs, Norwegian or foreign, end favourably 
for the parties, this can be seen in the example provided by Oliver Walton. “Norway 
did support some Sri Lankan NGOs in this context, however, they were to some extent 
damaged by their association with Norway as the peace process began to unravel”152 
Bart Klem discusses the Sri Lanka case in particular and states that “most people don’t 
single out the Norwegian NGOs from the rest. Frankly a lot of people on the ground 
wouldn’t know the difference between a Swedish, Danish or a Dutch, or French 
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NGO...or even a Japanese one for that matter, they`re just foreign.”153 “Though 
amongst the more politically aware class of course it was known that it could be used 
as a side for Norway`s political engagement.”154 Through the Norwegian press, 
Norwegians get the impression that Norwegian NGOs are clearly visible, doing vital 
work in every situation. The NGOs have many different roles and are not often 
solemnly responsible for an operation or their results, this does not become clear in 
the Norwegian media.  
Norwegian NGOs are GONGOs, Journalist Kjell Dragnes claims, explaining this as 
Government organized NGOs.155  He would not call them independent, but maybe 
rather dependent on the Norwegian state, which is not good for the country where 
peace negotiations are underway, or for Norway itself.156 NGOs are too tied together 
with the government and have a straw in the Treasury...in other countries they will be 
associated with the official Norwegian politics,157 Kjell Dragnes states. A positive 
effect of having NGOs involved in peace negotiations is the critical eyes they may 
look at the government`s work through, however, if this view is lost due to the 
interconnectedness of the two, the NGOs and the government will lose out. Mistakes 
may be discovered later, or not at all, and the people who are already in difficulties are 
the ones who will suffer; a situation can deteriorate without the right amount of 
scepticism. And who would bite the hand that feeds you?!  
 
4. 2 The Norwegian identity; how the Norwegians see themselves  
States like Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have had just as good conditions as 
Norway to get involved in peace negotiations, however the difference was what 
Norway allowed themselves to approach the issue differently, Jan Egeland claims.158 
After Norway saw the benefits of a successful peace negotiation, international peace 
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negotiations became a much bigger part of the foreign ministry`s agenda. Thorvald 
Stoltenberg pointed out that after the Oslo Process, Norway was being followed a lot 
closer.159 To be engaged in humanitarian issues as well as conflict resolution has 
become tradition for Norway. This, some claim, can be seen in the examples of the 
Nobel Peace Prize, the Peoples League`s efforts in the mid war years, the 
humanitarian efforts shown by Fridtjof Nansen, and the bridge building and UN 
engagement shortly after the Second World war.160 Moreover, some say this trend can 
also be seen in the opening of the Nobel Peace Centre in Oslo as well as the repeated 
markings of anniversaries for different peace agreements.	  Even the annual celebration 
of the constitution on the 17th of May can easily initiate peace ambitions. 
 However, just because some individuals have taken certain political directions and 
others have decided that some things are more important than others to take notice of, 
does not automatically make Norwegians a nation full of reconciliation loving peace 
negotiators.  It has been shown, in organizational studies, that a person`s nationality 
will have an effect on their cognitive schema, values, demeanour as well as language, 
and this will in turn have an effect on individual actions and also on group 
performances.161 Normally collective or single identities are temporary, they will 
always be objectives to transformation and reproduction, Terje Tvedt (2009) says.162 
However, in the case of Norway this image has stuck. “It is striking that people often 
pressure their image in the face of what seems in retrospect to have been clear 
evidence to the contrary. We ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that is 
confirms, or at least does not contradict, our own beliefs, and deny its validity.”163 The 
more exposure, the more this belief may be reinforced. This is what many claim 
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happened after the collapse of the Sri Lanka negotiations as well as with the Oslo 
Process.  
NGOs are often seen as a smaller actor which respects the civil society in Norway 
compared to the “big, bad” state, and they symbolize, not only to themselves but to the 
world, that we are all doing something.164 This feeling of togetherness and cooperation 
makes the individual feel like they are making a difference in the world by simply 
being Norwegian. This feeling of empowerment and importance is not something that 
the general population wants to give up.  
Harpviken and Skjelsbæk have written that “(P) peace politics has become a symbol 
that builds and strengthens our national identity. Peace politics is not based on ethical 
foundation only, but also on a strong idealistic self image. Ethics and self image 
strengthens each other. Likewise is the public debate full of objections to the image of 
the peace loving Norwegians, but most of it seems to just repel off.”165  Thorvald 
Stoltenberg claims that thinking we are better than other is an unfortunate view to 
have. “If you are told on a regular basis that you are a peace creator then you will start 
believing it.  Then you can even believe that you have larger possibilities to create 
peace than others who are interested in peace.”166                                                              
However, when asked if Norway does have any reason to do better than others the 
former Foreign Minister said that “Yes, we do! In the sense that if the parties 
genuinely want a solution we can have an advantage because we are harmless, but not 
necessarily because we are so peace loving!”167 However, most Norwegians will not 
be able to differentiate between the reasons why we may be attractive to others. It is 
assumed by many that Norway has a stronger peace tradition than most other 
comparable states in this field of work, however, in other countries, this image has not 
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become part of the other nations` self-image.168 This peace practice has become its 
own justification stating that Norwegians should promote peace because it is simply 
who we are and what we do.                                                                                       
The Norwegian self image and identity is lined with exceptionalism; the idea that 
Norwegians have “special abilities in promoting peace, international justice and 
humanitarian values, appears to be an important part of Norway`s identity and self-
image.169 In Norway the national identity is publicly discusses, but it is also a large 
part of the citizens` mental and social skills that are taken for granted.170 Even through 
striking changes in a state`s culture, their national identity may stay firm, this 
collective national identity can also act as a self-fulfilling prophecy by influencing 
politics.171  
Journalist Gro Holm thinks that Norway at times can have an exaggerated idea of the 
role it can play. “It can become a bit pathetic how we run after every conflict and want 
to play a special part.”172 She also says that “there are not many cases where Norway 
has the special qualifications to play a role, beyond what other countries can do,”173 
however she does add that Norway is seen as a peace negotiator who is rather selfless 
during the negotiation process it is a part of.                                                                       
“We have of course been involved in a series of conflicts where we haven’t had 
enough knowledge in Norway to base it on. For example talking about Sri Lanka, 
there were maybe two or three researchers in Norway that would have anything 
interesting to say about it”, Erik Solheim says, furthermore he adds “I don’t mean to 
be arrogant, but we have much more use of researchers in India, the USA, or Great 
Britain. Not many Norwegian NGOs or research facilities are relevant in regards to 
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this area, so you have to base your knowledge on something broader than Norway.”174 
Journalist Fredrik Græsvik argues that Norway does not have a history of entering into 
armed conflicts, but when it does, it has been done with peacekeeping forces, which is 
what leaves people with the idea of Norway as a peace negotiating nation.175 This is 
another explanation as to why Norwegians may have a slightly deluded self-image.   
“A lot of countries can say they’re positively disposed or regarded, and again I think 
that’s by virtue of history, culture or how you’ve evolved in terms of national identity. 
But that’s a forged identity. Just like we have a forged identity as a country that has 
contributed to international efforts in different ways at different times. That forged 
what our public thinks we do internationally. That might not always be consistent with 
the reality, but it’s a forged national identity,” an anonymous source said.176 The 
source continues to say that “if tomorrow, a Norwegian government came into power 
and said that we do not get enough out of this at the end of the day, there’s not been 
enough tangible results delivered, then it’s no longer your national identity.”177 This 
proves how fragile this “identity” really is and how easily it potentially could be taken 
away.  
International peace negotiation is as already mentioned an important part of 
Norwegian foreign policies. The former Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk thinks the 
Norwegians perception of themselves come from their background of religious ideas, 
and conservative as well as radical political socialist thinking. “We have this 
responsibility, we have possibilities, we have resources, and we are going to utilize 
them. We also have this conception of ourselves as a small country that has not been 
at war with other countries in a very long time, besides being occupied by other 
countries. We haven’t been in any aggressive war since the Viking age. We see 
ourselves as a country with long standing traditions of peaceful engagement with 
neighbouring countries and the world at large.”178  Furthermore, he claims that “It 
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might be that it’s in our nature, our orientation, to look at ourselves as more important 
than we actually are. It might be a kind of inferiority complex that results in a form 
of… not arrogance, but a feeling of having something that others need, when they’ve 
never actually asked for it, we might think that others should ask for it. At the same 
time you can say that, for some politicians, it’s been more a question of how to use 
Norwegian resources and advantages, to the extent we have any, than to promote 
Norwegian interests. In that case it has been more of a modest review of “what can we 
contribute with, that would be interesting, and will put Norway on the map”.179                                                                          
It is clear that peace negotiation and what this engagement represents are both 
intertwined in the Norwegian self image. Norwegians see themselves as more peaceful 
and more peace creating than most other states. But why is this? 
 
4.3 How did the reputation of Norway as an international peace 
negotiating “superpower” emerge? 
There are many explanations as to why the Norwegian public may see themselves as 
an international actor that plays a large role in creating world peace. One such 
explanation may be that “no other European leader(s) attaches its people’s identity 
with helping the world’s poor and creating peace.”180 However, Tvedt claims that 
“(F)few, if any, knows the effect of the multicultural in e.g. Torit in Sudan, Andikola 
in Nepal or Norway`s role as a peace negotiator in Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone 
etc.”181    
 
4.3.1 Can the politicians be held partly responsible?   
Some prominent Norwegian politicians are partly responsible for the view some have 
of Norway as a peace creating nation. “This has been a rather conscious project by the 
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Norwegian Foreign Ministry Services,” Kristian Harpviken claims, adding that 
Norway hosts the Nobel Peace Prize, which is the world`s most important award.182 
This prize distribution may have a confusing effect on some, as they believe it to be 
connected to Norway in some way. The reason why it is handed out in Norway is 
actually unknown.   
In Kjell Magne Bondevik`s new year`s speech as a Prime Minister on 31.12.1999 he 
stated the following: “Norway must be a nation of charity and solidarity. Let us follow 
in Fridtjof Nansen`s footsteps with faithful efforts for refugees and sufferers in other 
countries. Our nation is now deleting the poorest development nations` dept. Norway 
is one of the best when it comes to assistance.”183 Furthermore the ex Prime Minister 
said “Remember, as a solidarity state, we have reasons to be proud.”184                                                                                                                
As a Prime Minister you have tremendous influence over a large number of the 
population and even though some may not agree with your politics, everyone wants to 
hear and believe flattering words about their country and themselves as a people. 
Bondevik also said in the same speech to the Norwegian people that “Norway has to 
be a nation of peace -an actor for conflict resolution and peace creating actions. A 
nation that follows Nordahl Grieg`s strategy: `If you create human worthiness, you 
create peace. I wish that our capital shall appear as a city of peace. Remember, as a 
peace nation, we have reason to be proud.”185 Here Kjell Magne Bondevik talks of 
peace negotiations as one of Norway`s most important traits, and by linking this 
tradition to national heroes, the country`s history and a Christian culture he suggests 
that this characteristic of peace negotiations has to do with the very nature of the 
Norwegian nation and its people. Øystein Haga Skånland points out that “(I) if we 
follow Bondevik`s line of reasoning, peace promotion indeed appears as a necessary 
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practice for the reproduction of Norwegian identity.”186 Acclaimed journalist Hans-
Wilhelm Steinfeld said that the Norwegian`s image of themselves as a great peace 
negotiating nation comes from the politicians and how they boost about making a 
significant difference. He illustrates his point with this analogy: “a mouse sitting on a 
cart dragged by a horse along a dusty country road and looks back at all the dust 
swirling up and says “wow I am creating lots of dust!”187 Fellow journalist Kjell 
Dragnes also claims the Norwegian politicians are responsible for the misguided view 
Norwegians have of themselves. He mentions the quote from ex Prime Minister Gro 
Harlem Brundtland who said that “to be good is typically Norwegian.”188 Many 
journalists agree with the above statement, amongst them is  Kjell Dragnes who thinks 
that the view many Norwegians have of themselves is exaggerated as the successes 
have not been that many, with an exception of Guatemala in the 90`s.189  
There have been surprisingly many interview objects who critically opposed the 
mainstream opinions about Norway. 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims that many politicians have an inflated self image, not 
only in relation to the nation, but also in relation to themselves.190 He points out that 
many might say that this is the case in many countries, but he gives two reasons for 
why he believes this is not true. First, “in some states, like in Great Britain, they 
actually make a difference. What David Cameron does, gets ripple effects in 
Malaysia, and secondly, in many countries you have other things to talk about besides 
your own excellence like unsolved social problems and corruption.”191 The lack of 
social conflict and the large amount of money Norway has, he claims is a recipe for 
national selfishness. “The smaller you are, the more important you find others 
opinions of you.”192 It is a fact that small countries have to work harder to be noticed 
abroad, however there is a difference between being noticed abroad and thinking a 
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little too highly of yourself at home.                                                                                                                       
When Vidar Helgesen was in the Foreign Ministry he asked if they could end the use 
such expressions as humanitarian superpower, which was challenging as Kjell Magne 
Bondevik was the Prime Minister at the time,193 Helgesen stated.  
Simply being involved in a fairly high number of peace negotiations and peace 
creating projects does not make Norway a peace negotiating nation. Attempts are 
good and mostly well meant, however how many true successes has Norway really 
obtained? The answer to this is maybe surprising to many. Norway`s former Prime 
Minister, Thorbjørn Jagland stated in 2008 that “close to all the peace processes we 
have been involved in now lie in ruins`.”194 It is also important to remember that 
Norway rarely undertakes a peace negotiation mission where it acts alone as a 
facilitator. Norway has not got sticks nor carrots, and this will inevitably limit the 
country`s own efforts and possibilities. Even though Norway is an affluent country it 
does not have the right resources to guarantee peace settlements without the 
contribution of other states.195 It all comes down to the country`s lack of hard power.  
It is not a problem for anyone that Norway wants to “play with the big boys.” Norway 
has funds and no power so if other more powerful nations can be a part of a peace 
process and get some of the praise and glory, why not? “When the foreign ministerial 
elite established a political project, they gave it legitimacy within the general 
population. As this elite decided to make Norway a humanitarian power, they had to 
influence the Norwegian opinion in a way that made them not just support it, but 
celebrated it. Without this, there is no point being a politician!”196, Terje Tvedt says. 
He also claims that the media was a part of building this support, and that there is a 
close bond between the media and the foreign policies. 197                                                    
So what role may the media have in the Norwegians` perception of themselves?  
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4.3.2 Is the view Norwegians have of themselves connected to how 
Norwegians are portrayed in their national media?   
Images on Norwegian TV channels from e.g. the Red Cross or Norwegians People 
Aid in refugee camps in Rwanda or with starving children in the Horn of Africa, are 
shown not only because it represents news, nor because it gives new information 
about the humanitarian crisis, but because it shows that the Norwegian people are 
present, making a difference and that the Norwegian community has a conscience and 
morality.198 Public support for this type of work is vital to politicians, and from 1980 
to 2001 almost one billion Norwegian kroner has been allocated to information 
measures to affect the public opinion.199                                                                                  
Today’s media is an influential tool that reaches the whole Norwegian population one 
way or the other. The feeling of “all” Norwegians doing their part simply be being 
Norwegian comes from the media to a large extent. In 2002 and 2003 the Norwegian 
newspaper “Dagbladet” featured articles about Norwegian aid ministers` travels in 
different African countries.200 These articles were not so much about Norwegian 
foreign policy as they were about the image of Norwegians as good Samaritans and 
how appreciated the Norwegian`s presence was in these countries.201 The cost for the 
journalists to join the politicians on their travels was not always covered by the news 
companies, but by the Foreign Ministry, this important point was not mentioned in 
any of the articles.202 With articles like this which can be viewed as highly misleading, 
it not strange that the Norwegian`s self image as peace-spreaders is present.  
In the time period from 01.01.2000 to 01.08.2002 the major Norwegian newspapers 
VG, Dagbladet, Vårt Land, Aftenposten and Dagsavisen  published a total of 654 
articles related to Norway`s efforts in Sudan, Guatemala and Sri Lanka.203 Out of the 
119 articles Aftenposten had featured on Sudan none were about the Norwegian 
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strategies in the conflict torn country, but rather they were rewarding Norway for not 
giving up on the peace negotiations.204 In Dagbladet`s 57 articles about Sudan the 
focus was on issues such as the Norwegian minister Hilde Frafjord Johnson seeing 
images she would never forget.205 Once again the focus was on Norway`s 
humanitarian side and not the actual policies that they try to implement to improve the 
conditions in the country. In VG`s 61 articles, Dagsavisen`s 65 and Vårt Land`s 30 
articles on Sudan, during the same time period, there were no mentioning of the 
Norwegian political efforts.206                                                                                                            
In the same five major newspapers there were 129 articles published on Guatemala, 
but not one mentioned what efforts Norway had implemented to aid the situation.207 
Furthermore, out of the 403 articles these five newspapers wrote on Sir Lanka (during 
the same time period) it was only mentioned that “we”, the Norwegians, have been 
present.208 The extent of how the national media twist Norway`s presence in a conflict 
torn country to gain public support and unity around a peace negotiation mission is 
alarming.                                                                                                                                           
During the interviews with some highly esteemed Norwegian journalists, a question 
about whether safety working as a Norwegian journalist in certain areas sometimes 
decrease was asked. Fredrik Græsvik said that “Yes, because it may be that someone 
does not like Norway`s engagements, in some cases it has lead to dangerous situations 
where it is complicated to be a Norwegian journalist like for example in Gaza.”209 
This is not an angle of the Norwegian peace efforts that is being covered much by the 
national press. If there was a hundred per cent wish for peace in a country, you 
wouldn’t have a conflict. The people who want war are often a minority,210 Erik 
Solheim claims. “If you involve these minorities in peace negotiations, you might also 
import terrorist problems to Norway, which can create insecurity for Norwegians and 
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especially Norwegian peace negotiators. You always have to consider this.”211 This 
dilemma was also mentioned by Jonas Gahr Støre during my interview with him.                                                                                                                                 
Another journalist raised a valid point reporting on the Norwegian peace efforts. The 
very detailed information is often kept from journalists so reporting on these issues 
becomes difficult. Furthermore, the progress made is often so small that it is hard to 
report in the media. However, the information that does come out is blown up by the 
Norwegian press, if the public support increases, so may the financial contributions 
from the public. As the financial support for newspapers` foreign news sections has 
decreased, the reliance on journalists to portray the `Norwegian Samarian` has 
increased.212 But although this may be needed to maintain the view of Norway as an 
international peace negotiator of a certain standard, Terje Tvedt claims that “(T) the 
journalists have seemed to, without a principle reflection, let themselves get 
overwhelmed by the kindhearted regime`s moral status and values.”213 An example is 
the general way that the Norwegian Middle East involvement was covered in the 
national media. The coverage “crystallized around certain discursive constructions, 
resulting in the emergence of a very positive representation of Norwegian peace 
efforts in general. This representation remained dominant, even when challenged by 
emerging alternatives. It thus supplied the interpretative optic through which other 
Norwegian peace initiatives were seen, and added to their status and perceived 
importance.”214 A peace negotiation always has two, or more, sides to it, however it is 
a rarity to get both, or all, the different sides served in the Norwegian media. The 
viewpoint through Norwegian glasses takes priority.  
Another renowned Norwegian journalist stated that the Norwegian press has hyped up 
the facilitator work Norway contributed to the Middle East for many years after the 
peace process collapsed and Norway was out of the conflict. “We always want to 
believe the best about ourselves”, the journalist claim. “A small country, with little 
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conflict becomes very self-centred; Aftenposten and NRK have hyped Norway so 
much that people in the end start to believe that we are an important country.”215 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims that this could have happened independently of our 
role in the Oslo process. “If they write about Jonas Gahr Støre`s trips to different 
countries every day then people will get the impression that everybody in Jordan and 
Syria know very well who he is and admire him because he is smarter then you and 
looks good in a suit, just because Aftenposten says so.”216                                                         
For people who have an analytical relationship to this topic, the Oslo Process may 
have made a difference to their perception of themselves, but “for most people I 
believe that it is what you hear in the news and in the newspapers that characterized 
the national self image and get the impression that Norway is an important 
country.”217   
“It is probably so that the media is not so interested in elaborating on the details. It is 
more catching if the Minister of Foreign Affairs has visited eight countries in five 
days and jetted around and still looks sharp. The media apply hero worship or the 
opposite, and when Norwegians are abroad and getting noticed in a very specific 
sector then this creates a lot of media attention back home,”218 Vidar Helgesen 
continue saying “I remember when we were in Sri Lanka I joked that the media know 
of only two terms related to peace processes. The one being breakthrough the other 
collapse. Everything not being one or the other holding no significance.”219  
The news editors are concerned about the number of newspapers sold or the number 
of TV viewers, which will both increase with “juicy” and powerful headings and 
catchy stories. Who doesn’t like to hear encouraging words about themselves!? It is 
also much easier to grasp efforts, than it is to grasp results. Results are usually a long 
time in the making and they might appear gradually. Efforts are typically more action 
filled, full of optimism and it therefore “feeds” the Norwegian self image.  
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So when did these trends developed by politicians and the media begin? Many will 
say it all started with the “Oslo Process”.  
 
4.3.3 Has the Oslo Process affected the way Norwegians and others see 
Norway`s peace negotiation efforts today?  
Has this view roots in reality or has there maybe been created a “myth” regarding 
Norway`s “humanistic” ways? Do we live of old history? “Yes, absolutely! The name 
Oslo as well, it refers to Norway, this is something that people remember and have 
knowledge of,”220 this was Knut Vollebæk`s response when asked if the Oslo Process 
is still the basis of how Norwegians are evaluated today.                                                                           
Jan Egeland points out that if the Oslo Process had been kept secret, like he wanted, 
then “Norway would be a nation that is connected to mediation on a smaller scale.”221 
Aftenposten, on the 29th of April 2012 wrote that next year is the 20th anniversary of 
the modern Norwegian peace nation. This was justified by the upcoming 20th 
anniversary of the Oslo Process, which, it stated, was seen by many as the starting 
point for Norwegian peace negotiations.222                                                                                                                                        
During the “Oslo Process” the Norwegians NGO Fafo was heavily involved to the 
point where the drafts were written on official Fafo paper, so that if anything leaked, 
you could say that it was only an academic exercise. In a lot of sensitive negotiations, 
it is very beneficial to have an NGO as a partner to a state.223 The “Oslo Process” with 
its ripple effects further fueled the cooperation between Norwegian NGO`s and the 
state.  
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4.4 What advantages, if any, might Norway have as an international 
peace negotiator?  
All interview objects, regardless of background, gave very similar answers to this 
question. The desire to solve conflicts and to provide aid seems well connected to the 
feeling of a moral obligation to help and to show that they care. Many Norwegians 
feel an almost nationalistic urge to show that they notice wrongdoings and are not 
turning a blind eye.                                                                                                                
One of the things that make it possible for Norway to engage itself in these political 
aspects is the fact that the country has no colonial past.  This makes the country very 
attractive as a third part intervener as it limits the fear parties might have as to why 
Norway wants to be involved. With no colonial past, Norway is not out to gain 
territory or symbolic relics.                                                                                                    
Norway is a small country, with a population which just reached five million citizens, 
but if you take the country`s widespread maritime economic zone into account 
Norway places amongst the 15 largest states in the world.224 This makes Norway gain 
economic power in areas such as seafood, shipping as well as petroleum and puts 
Norway in the category as one of the riches countries in the world, as well as being an 
important player in the international energy sector.225  It is also important to look at 
the political power that this ranking gives Norway, for instance in the Arctic region. 
Kristian Stokke also states that this resource-based national wealth is the reason for 
the country`s disproportionate international engagement in humanitarian assistance, 
peace promotion, development aid, contributions to the UN as well as to the cause of 
climate change. 226  
Peter Petrasek, Professor at Ottawa University, claims that Norway has three distinct 
advantages: “a foreign policy consensus..., the capacity for independent action, 
outside EU rules, and up till now, at least, some willingness to take risks; and third, 
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the money to finance lengthy and costly processes.”227                                                                                                                                             
When asked what characterises the Finnish way of doing peace negotiation, Finnish 
Ambassador to Indonesia Kai Sauer said that “(W) we do not come with baggage, we 
have no colonial past, we are honest brokers, we have a rather pragmatic mentality 
and we also like to treat the parties equally, this we have in common with the 
Norwegians and the Swedes.”228  This shows how very similar Norway`s and other 
countries really are and that the characteristics that many consider special to Norway 
are in fact traits possessed by many. The advantages Norway has are “not necessarily 
unique to Norway as there are other countries that have the same qualities. But it’s a 
combination of those things all together: positive international perception, positive 
engagement, international efforts, investment in development cooperation, plus the 
all-party commitment, and the infrastructure within government to train and sustain 
staff that are knowledgeable. That package of things is an advantage in terms of being 
able to engage positively,”229 an anonymous source stated. 
Jehan Perera, who works at the National Peace Council for Sri Lanka, points out the 
fact that not only is Norway small, rich and far away, but it cannot force or impose 
anything on anyone.230 This makes Norway a safer bet than other states when it comes 
to negotiating.                                                                                                                                      
“I would say money holds great significance”231, Vidar Helgesen points out, financial 
funds hold their importance in giving Norway many partners around the world.232  
However, this is not something typically Norwegian, but something that Norway 
happens to possess due to oil resources. Ambassador Wegger Strømmen agrees with 
this. “You often have to stay involved over a long period of time, peace negotiations 
are something that can come from the involvement of humanitarian assistance over 
many years,”233 this happened in both Sri Lanka and Sudan. Fellow (ex) Ambassador 
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Hans Brattskar said that “We are often viewed as a player who is more neutral than 
other countries. In Sri Lanka, they tried to find out why Norway was there... Is it to 
convert the country to Christianity?  Is it to take over the oil resources that haven’t yet 
been found? They didn’t have a plausible thing to point out. Such an altruistic 
approach is hard to swallow for many people, as cynical as you may be. This is true 
for Norway and many other countries as well.”234  
These advantages that Norway possesses are mostly unrelated to direct political 
actions, but rather to history and geographical factors. Having no colonial past 
diminishes the idea that Norway has any “personal” interests in states they are trying 
to help. Having the oil sources have provided Norway with a  well equipped Treasury, 
which in turn is beneficial as the cost of facilitation and ensuring long term tension 
reduction is high. Moreover, the agreement across different political parties helps to 
carry on the peace negotiation work regardless of who`s elected into government.  
Above, how Norwegians see themselves and the different characteristics of 
Norwegian peace politics have been discussed, but how do other states perceive the 
Norwegians and their peace negotiation efforts? 
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5. How is Norway viewed as an international peace 
negotiator by other states?   
How a state looks at itself or ought to see itself has been widely covered in the 
literature. When Norway started with international peace negotiations and 
humanitarian assistance it was made very clear that it was to be work done purely out 
of solidarity and humanitarian cooperation, and not to promote economical, political 
or religious interests.235  However, in October 1999, the Foreign Ministry produced a 
report concerning the modernization of the foreign politics. This report concluded that 
it was important to have one clear voice to promote Norway`s interests 
internationally.236 The Norwegian society will benefit from the largest amount of 
power possible,237 the report stated.  
The Norwegian journalists who were interviewed for this thesis all had a rather similar 
idea of how Norway is seen by other nations when it comes to peace negotiation 
efforts. One of the journalists pointed out that when it comes to the Middle East 
conflict the Palestinians feel that in the end of the day, Norway only does what the EU 
and the US want, and that Norway does not really dear to challenge Israel, it is only 
talk , no action. For Israel, some of the journalists say that the US is the only country 
that counts. Norway, on the other hand, prides itself on the Oslo Process, and its so-
called “success”. Norway is seen as a naive country, one journalist states, a country 
that has no idea of actual realities on the ground.                                                                           
Norway had a peak after the Middle East conflict resolutions, and was involved in Sri 
Lanka and a few other conflicts, but this is nothing that the outside world is paying 
much attention to, Fredrik Græsvik claims.238 And when asked whether his foreign 
colleges look at Norway in the same way as the Norwegians do he said: “In no way, 
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Norway is a small bracket in the world, that is just the way it is.”239 Fellow journalist 
Kjell Dragnes said that in some conflicts Norway is seen as a party in the conflict 
itself. The best example of this is in Sri Lanka where the government in Colombo saw 
Norway as the Tamil`s spokes person.240 This can be the result of a country without 
carrots or sticks intervene in a heavy, long lasting conflict.  
The Norwegian academic Terje Tvedt says that “Jan Egeland wrote in a chronicle that 
Brussels, Washington, Moscow and New York looked towards Oslo, there exists no 
evidence of this within any sources.”241 He continue saying that “There are no sources 
which states that Moscow at any point has discussed or considered turning to Oslo to 
help solve conflicts, and there has not been many incidences of the Americans doing 
this either, although they have asked Norway for advice as they have done with other 
allies.”242  
 Terje Tvedt mentions that in many books written by foreign authors about peace 
negotiations, e.g. in Sudan, Norway is not even mentioned; this, he says, is another 
example of the gap that is present. This is an aspect of peace negotiations that the 
Norwegians are consciously shielded from. It hardly fits well with the image of 
Norway as a great Samaritan for all in need of Norway`s “outstanding” values and 
ethics.  
“When it comes to the involved elites, Norway has a presence, they are aware of 
Norway,”243 says Thomas Hylland Eriksen when asked about how Norway is viewed 
by other states. “However, the biggest problem in the reputation project by Jonas Gahr 
Støre, which he started a few years ago, I think it was not that Norway a bad 
reputation, but that they did not have a reputation at all! People in large parts of the 
world never think about Norway, and knows little about our country. However, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Græsvik, Fredrik. Interviewed by phone. 05.03.2012. 
240 Dragnæs, Kjell. Interviewed by email. 29.02.2012 
241 Tvedt, Terje. Interviewed. 07.02.2012.  
242 i.b.i.d  
243 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. Interviewed 26.03.2012.  
	  	  
63	  
areas like Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Gaza, where Norway has been actively involved 
in the attempt to create peace, Norwegians are looked upon as naive and idealistic.”244  
Norway definitely does not have a bad reputation after all their peace negotiation 
involvements, but some places where Norway has been heavily involved, the 
reputation is negative. This is mostly the view of the parties involved in the conflicts. 
Of course many Norwegians have been critical to different peace projects Norway has 
been involved in, however, this is not generally reflected in the public opinion.     
Stein Tønnesson is under the impression that Norway is a state which has been noticed 
by others for its work, but he also adds that there are some who feels that Norway is a 
rich and naive country which does little productive.245 Furthermore, he also mentions 
that some see Norway as a state that seems to acts neutral when they really promote 
the USA, the West and the Israeli`s values, whilst others see it as a country that has no 
power at all to create peace.246 These views are believed to be more common than 
people want to think.  
Professor Jonathan Goodhand at London`s School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS) stated that “certainly Norway thinks it is very positively viewed, because of 
its role in relation to peace, humanitarian and human rights issues. Norway sees itself 
as getting a seat at the senior tables at discussions and getting access to major powers 
because of its role.”247 During his research Prof. Goodhand found that the US was 
very positive to Norway playing this kind of a role “because Norway was able to do 
things that the US was not, but would like somebody to do.” He mentions that this 
would be for example “to talk to warring parties and to get access to multiple sides, 
which a global hegemon would find much more difficult to do.” 248 Here Norway is 
used as a tool by more powerful states to achieve their goals in certain peace 
negotiations. This is a way for Norway to get on a hegemon`s good side.  
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A source, who wishes to stay anonymous says that there are “two schools of thought” 
when it comes to how Norway is viewed by others as a peace negotiator. One is an 
idea of courage and capabilities and the other claims that Norway actually never 
achieved any positive results.                                                                                                    
Jehan Perera described Norway as a small state in a positive way, which is located off 
the centre of the world`s power politics, she continues to say that this is why Norway 
has made peace making part of its identity.249  Those who are critical of Norway 
describe the country as an attachment to the US policies.250 An anonymous source said 
that Norway used to be perceived as a more essential player, but nowadays it is less 
risk-taking than it was. “It has aligned itself very much with the US on many, many 
cases, and has spent a great deal of effort developing this relationship across the 
Atlantic.”251 This does damage to Norway`s image of neutrality252, the source states. 
“Just because they are Norwegians they think they are born negotiators. Even though 
Norway has some of that heritage it does not mean that all Norwegians are good 
negotiators,”253 says another source who also wished to remain anonymous. “Frankly, 
I think a lot of people in Sri Lanka didn’t really bother to consider what they thought 
about the Norwegians.”254  “Norway was selected because they were weak, far way, 
had no major interest this is something that Norway cannot change.”255  
Different countries evaluate Norway differently, Erik Solheim pointed out. “India or 
China will for example perceive that we are close to the Americans and Western 
countries, while USA will perceive that we are a more independent actor.”256 This 
distinction is interesting and shows the way Norway is perceived differently through 
different eyes. Many will see Norway as a state that acts much on behalf of the US, 
however, as the US uses Norway in different situations, they choose to see Norway as 
independent which suits them better.  
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Norwegian Ambassador to Sudan Jens-Petter Kjemprud says that if we do not follow 
the main guidelines for involvement, like treating both sides equally and being wanted 
as a peace negotiator, Norway can be seen as “pretentious, pushing above our 
weight... and sometimes seen as useful idiots for the parties involved.”257 “Most 
people do not have the impression of any particular state as peace negotiator, most 
people think of the UN as a peace negotiator.”258 Jan Egeland does not believe that 
there are many in this world who connect Norway with peace negotiations, but he also 
points out that there are not many nations that peace negotiations is associated with at 
all. 259  However, if you ask diplomats who work for the UN in New York or in 
Europe, many will associate Norway with peace negotiations, Jan Egeland claims. He 
adds that the Oslo agreement is one of a small number of very well known peace 
agreements together with Camp David and Dayton Agreement.260 The Guatemalan 
Peace Accords in 1996 is an agreement that is forgotten by many. It is remembered 
only in Guatemala and in certain sectors in Norway, as the success it was.261  
 
It is not surprising that Norway`s work is known within certain sectors, however the 
large majority of  people working within politics in other states do not associate 
Norway with peace negotiations, but, in Norway people are under the impression that 
this is what Norwegians are known for abroad.  
Jon Hanssen-Bauer, at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, has a different idea of how 
Norway is seen. He claims that Norway has a positive reputation in peace 
negotiations, and that Norway collaborates well with most other countries who are 
involved in the field, moreover, he states that we get a large amount of respect for the 
work we do which again is seen in the top level contact we achieve.262  
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There are many different perceptions of Norway, but what made Norway choose to 
focus so much on peace negotiation?  
 
 
5.1 Why get involved in peace negotiations at all? What effects can this 
involvement have on a state`s foreign policy?  
Norwegians wish to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as a people promoting 
peace, human rights, equality and democracy. It all boils down to the fact that many 
feel the Norwegian society is better and more fair than almost all other societies and 
that “Norwegian values” will create progress for most other states. This is typical of 
the Norwegian mentality. Norwegians have to be best, or else there is no point trying. 
“Norway is not present in Europe, but has been very present in the UN since the 
beginning, and this indicates some ideas that democracy is easy to make happen as 
long as you just want it bad enough,”263 this is an idea that Norway and the US have in 
common, Thomas Hylland Eriksen claims.                                                                                                                                               
When Terje Tvedt was asked why he thought it was not written more about Norway`s 
unsuccessful peace negotiation attempts, he responded that “those who wrote the 
NORAD report are the same people who have given advise to the Foreign Ministry 
with regards to Sudan, they have given advise in connection with Sri Lanka, and this 
is not research...it is not an historical analysis about Norway`s role in Sri Lanka.”264  
Furthermore, Norway does not have independent think tanks and journalistic 
groupings like e.g. in the US, where the Foreign Ministry is constantly being 
presented with reports on Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam.265  
The Foreign Ministry increases its power. This is in contradiction to what Norwegians 
think and wants to think,266 Terje Tvedt stated.  
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Norwegian NGOs have often been involved with humanitarian work in conflicts 
where the Norwegian government later decides to negotiate peace. Therefore, 
Norwegian development aid can be strongly linked to many a Norwegian peace 
negotiation effort. When asked why Norway would go from humanitarian assistance 
to peace negotiations, and if Norway really can make a difference, Ambassador 
Wegger Strømmen said; “Maybe not as often as people hope, but sometimes I believe 
we can make a difference. If the violence keeps on whilst you provide aid, it can 
create a moral dilemma.”267 Some claim that one of the major reasons this aid 
continues is because it provides the negotiators with invaluable contacts and maybe 
also a better reputation. Isak Svensson et al. state that it is probable that there would 
be a minimum, if not no Norwegian aid to Sri Lanka if it was not for the Norwegian 
NGOs` involvement in the peace process.268 Due to the NGOs close relationship with 
governments they can act as an early warning system when a conflict is deescalating.                                                                                                                                                      
In White Paper nr. 1, 2008-2009 titled “Interests, responsibilities and opportunities” it 
is stated that “it is not possible for the Norwegian government to safeguard the 
Norwegian society`s interests without at the same time contribute to making global 
public goods safe.”269 “It can become unclear whether it is peace or security that the 
Foreign Ministry has had as a goal when resources are put towards other countries 
conflicts. There is not always a sharp divide between peace politics and security 
politics. (C) “contributing to peace and reconciliation work is a form of modern 
security politics...The Foreign Ministry should mostly be engaged with issues 
concerning Norwegian interests, but I think it is also in Norway`s interest that 
conflicts do not turn violent, and that they can be solved peacefully,”270 Jonas Gahr 
Støre states.                                                                                                                            
Many have blamed the government of spending more of their diplomatic resources on 
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building peace other places in the world then securing citizens at home.”271 Harpviken 
and Skjelsbæk say that when commitments to the alliance as a NATO member results 
in Norway participating in conflict operations outside of NATO`s area, it raises 
questions on how independent Norway is with regards to peace politics.272 Norway 
wants to be seen as self determined and neutral by not joining the EU, and at the same 
time it has wished to increase its security by being an active NATO member. Norway 
gets involved with peace negotiations “to maintain our own interests”273 many 
politicians claim. A violent conflict is not just a threat to people in the close 
proximity, but it can have a ripple effect on us, a typical example is Balkan, Thorvald 
Stoltenberg points out.274 He also mentions that as a small country Norway has a 
greater need for foreign policy.275                                                                                                    
Knut Vollebæk, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was quoted in Aftenposten in 1995 
saying that “(W) when I talk with Kinkel, with van den Broek and Axworthy and 
Talbott, they are very interested in what happened in the Middle East. What did I 
make of my visit there? What is my view on that? And then I slip in some words about 
salmon and the gas market directives and such things, because I have already given 
them something.”276                                                                                                                                                                  
It is correct, what Thorvald Stoltenberg pointed out that we are only 0.08 ‰ of the 
world`s population and to act like 0.08 ‰ of the world`s population would not benefit 
Norway`s national interest277, however how much of the reasons for doing peace 
negotiations is doing good and how much is done due to national interests? That to be 
involved in politics may raise a state`s standing internationally is not negative, 
however it depends on the reasons for the involvement in the projects. Terje Tvedt 
argues that “This is what we have chosen to do”, although “the expertise is not very 
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high” 278, during the Oslo Process there was almost no research done on the subject he 
adds. “Norway must do something, and we are outside the EU which gives Norway a 
potential others do not have.279”   
 Thomas Hylland Eriksen argues that the reason for getting involved in peace 
negotiations is “about getting fame, or positive reputation as the Foreign Ministry 
calls it, so in this sense it is in Norway`s interest to be known and admired by the 
outside world. This is Norway`s big dream as it is for many small countries.”280 He 
claims that “the Norwegian Foreign Ministry has a wish to represent the good, which 
he believes is genuine in large parts of the ministry, they believe that they are 
representing something good, but also the fact that Norway shall become visible and 
well known, and not just as a appendage to Sweden, which was the humanitarian 
superpower in the mid 80`s.When Sweden found itself unable to continue with this 
kind of work, Norway was standing ready with its oil money.281  
An academic had the following answer when asked why a state would go into peace 
negotiations at all. From the research on mediator motives, it is clear that political 
considerations are a driving force in mediation, yet there is little evidence in support 
of clear neo-colonial or imperialistic motives among mediators. Since any mediation 
effort involves costs in time, resources and prestige, mediators do get involved in 
mediation based on an estimation of the rewards they believe they will get from 
engaging in mediation activities. The rewards from a mediation effort can arise either 
from material rewards (such as access to new markets or enhancing security) or 
immaterial rewards (such as promoting certain values or gaining /earning prestige).282  
Canadian diplomat Ben Rowswell said that the reasons you enter into an international 
peace negotiation is that “(I) if successful, peace negotiations lead directly to the 
termination of conflicts which stabilize international relations and generic negative 
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knock-on effects like humanitarian disasters, mass migration, and the export of 
terrorism.  It can have several impacts on a state's foreign policy, ranging from 
positive (raising profile, generating tangible outcomes if negotiations succeed in 
terminating conflict) to negative (exposing the country to greater criticism by local 
parties to a conflict, or requiring the country to refrain from passing judgment on 
human rights violations in order to retain credibility with all parties e.g. Human rights 
abuses by the Sri Lankan government in the final months of the civil war in that 
country).”283   
Like Ben Rowswell points out, a state will always weigh the pros and cons when it 
comes to intervening in peace negotiations. Although the image of Norway being 
someone that helps all those in need, Erik Solheim pointed out some examples where 
Norway has denied negotiating peace talks. Norway has not been involved in peace 
processes in countries where Norway has considerable oil interests. Statoil has for 
example large investments in Angola, which could create problems. Another example 
is that Solheim got many inquiries about a Norwegian engagement in Chechnya. He 
said it would be very hard because Norway is a neighbouring country to Russia and 
has very strong interests in our relationship with them, therefore it would be very hard 
for us to be neutral in that conflict.284  
A nation`s image that is part of its identity is hard to change. Even with failures like in 
Sri Lanka, the image Norwegians have of themselves has not changed. Vidar 
Helgesen points to the fact that much of the foreign policy questions have an element 
of the right people at the right place at the right time, much like what Jan Egeland 
stated. Vidar Helgesen explains; “(M) my boss when I was in the Foreign Ministry, 
Jan Pettersen, often talked about the underestimated dimension to international 
questions; coincidences. And that, I think, is really important. Common belief is that 
there is a strategy behind everything, but coincidences matters not least in this field. I 
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believe additionally one must weigh the personal element or interest, because when 
engaging in foreign politics many processes are long spanned.”285 
The Norwegian interview objects answered the question of why a state would choose 
to get involved in peace negotiations rather similarly. They look at Norway`s history 
as an explanation why this is something Norway is still actively involved in. Hans 
Brattskar explains Norway’s involvement in the peace negotiation field by saying that 
“We have long traditions for humanitarian work, ever since we became independent in 
1905. It has affected us ever since, in different ways. Not just in regards to peace and 
reconciliation work, but also with significant humanitarian efforts and assistance. This 
is a part of our foreign policy, part of our national character if you may. The question 
is not if this is an important thing to do, it is more about how we do it, and do we do it 
right”286  
Knut Vollebæk claims that the two main reasons why Norwegians are involved in 
peace negotiations are the religious process that began with the missionary movement 
in the 1850s, and the radical socialist solidarity movement from the 1880s.287 
“Norway wants a stable world, and a stable world requires engagement. If we do not 
have a stable world, it will have economical consequences for us all, and 
consequences for our foreign policy in many ways. You have an element of national 
interest to promote Norway’s bilateral interests, and you have an overriding foreign 
policy interest of stability, not least in our part of the world, but a conflict anywhere in 
the world will have a consequence for Norway, considering refugee flows and what 
will happen afterwards, where we are asked to contribute with economical 
reconstruction and such. It’s a combination of those two,”288 Knut Vollebæk says.  
It is true that a large conflict abroad can affect Norway in different ways and that it is 
in Norway`s interest to maintain a peaceful environment for cooperation, business and 
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shared opportunities, however, there is another reason why Norway is involved in 
peace negotiations. One fundamental thing is the political will to do this. Take a 
neighbouring country like Finland, Erik Solheim points out, “they have no wish to 
interfere in other countries’ conflicts. They have historically been in a very difficult 
situation, and they’re scared of getting into trouble, while Norway has a strong will to 
interfere in other conflicts.”289                                                                                                             
Jan Egeland says that Norway`s peace negotiation engagement is present for two 
reasons. Firstly, contributing to peace has been a goal for Norway for a very long time 
like it is for most other states, and secondly, “it puts Norway in a whole different 
league in international diplomacy.”290   
By having peace negotiations on their foreign policy agenda, many Norwegians feel 
that it helps promote the “Norwegian values” and spread a positive view of Norway 
internationally. This view is what the Norwegians see themselves.                                    
Below, a very important reason why Norway chooses to facilitate peace is discussed.  
 
5.1.2 Being involved in international peace negotiation can open doors 
In the White Paper nr. 15, 2008-2009, it is written that “Norway`s role in peace 
processes is basically altruistically motivated, but we contribute, together with other 
actors, to global common goods. Norway`s visibility increases and gives access to 
actors in international politics that it otherwise would be hard for a small country like 
Norway to talk to.”291 In the same document the following is stated: “A positive 
picture of Norway can open doors when it comes to contact with other states` 
authorities and business life for Norwegian companies wanting to get established 
abroad.”292 If a peace negotiation goes well, it offers you the seats at tables you 
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otherwise wouldn’t get invited to, if you’re a smaller or middle power. It’s that ability 
to have access, and the ability to be perceived as a player by bigger powers, that many 
think is a benefit to Norway`s foreign policy, which is an important reason why 
Norway gets involved in international peace negotiations in the first place. 
Vidar Helgesen stated that “it is not necessarily so that one uses this access 
particularly cynical and with purpose, e.g. that one talks peace for 15 minutes and then 
move on to politics of interest, but I do remember well from my process in Sri Lanka, 
at that time the Foreign Vice President of the U.S.A. was deeply involved. This gave 
me a great deal of access to him and not only with regards to Sri Lanka, but about 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan  and also on other subjects, there was no trouble calling 
him at any time addressing issues and there is no doubt this sort of contact is very 
useful.”293  
Norway has found its niche and uses this type of policies as a way of opening doors. 
The Former Norwegian Prime Thorvald Stoltenberg said that “(W) when you are first 
recognized as a peace negotiator, it gives a network that is useful for Norway long 
after the conflict is over.294”Ambassador Wegger Strømmen also thinks that peace 
negotiations can open doors. “Very much of our time with the Americans is spent 
discussing regional conflicts. Sometimes the cooperation is very close, like in the 
Middle East where Norway`s most important role was, and still is to chair the aid 
mechanism to the Palestinians. Any conversation between the Foreign Minister and 
the Americans will have a large component of “door opening”. This is also the case in 
Sudan and Sri Lanka.”295  
Erik Solheim points to an important matter. He says that you cannot contribute with 
anything unless you have a good relationship with the USA, India, Russia, China and 
the EU.296 Peace negotiations may open doors, but according to Solheim you cannot 
do this type of work without certain connections. It varies from conflict to conflict 
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who`s involved, but the USA is always there, and one of the others will normally be 
there as well.297 
For a small country like Norway, gaining high positioned contacts is very valuable. To 
have doors opening is definitely a benefit to Norway, but it depends on why this is 
done. Norwegians think that their country’s peace negotiation efforts come from a 
place of selflessness, and if this is not the whole truth, this should be widely known. 
With this in mind, what else is important to focus on going forward?   
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6. Conclusion 
Before presenting the concluding remarks I want to demonstrate what some of the 
interview objects find important for Norway to be able to keep peace negotiations as a 
profiled part of its foreign policy.  
 
6.1 Norway’s future peace negotiation strategies; what is important to 
focus on  
The politicians have to think about the near future, but the solutions to these peace 
negotiation problems need long term solutions. Instead of trying to solve all from the 
top, we should focus more on laying one stone at the time.298 Many of the interview 
objects have mentioned that to continue this work, the importance of secrecy is key. In 
order to get long time enemies to talk or even to contemplate the possibility of being 
in contact requires a high level of secrecy. The big question here is whether these 
politicians and diplomats are worthy of our trust to carry out these efforts?299                  
During the Oslo Process, secrecy was a vital condition to meet, and a reason why it 
was managed to make some progress. It was something the parties required, not 
something that Norway came up with. The negotiations in the Middle East were secret 
until the very last stage, Erik Solheim underlines300, and without it, it would not have 
been possible.  “We were in Sri Lanka for a year and a half in absolute secrecy; only 
two people in Colombo knew what we were doing.”301                                                            
When the Norwegian Foreign Minister was asked what percentage of Norway`s peace 
facilitations are secret versus public, his answer was about 50-50%. “50% of what we 
do is not suitable to do publicly out of respect for the discretion needed.”302                            
The Norwegian public seems to be very comfortable with the idea of secrecy. They 
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know their government is doing something, they might not know the details, but 
they’re satisfied that whatever their government’s role is, it’s a positive one.303 Are 
Norwegians a bit naive? Do they not care? Or do they know too little about the subject 
to understand the repercussions of a states’ involvement in international peace 
negotiations?  
“It is becoming clear that Norway may have overrated its own popularity in parts of 
the world. One thing is that Erik Solheim is the most unpopular person in Sri Lanka. If 
you look at Africa, there is a tendency that they want African peace negotiators, they 
would rather have Kofi Annan than Jonas Gahr Støre,”304 Thomas Hylland Eriksen 
points out. Many might wonder what skills Norwegians have to understand others, as 
they do not even know what real poverty it!                                                                                                    
It is important to become a bit more sensitive to cultural and especially political 
cultural difference. Hylland Eriksen amongst others agrees on this. “Politics is about 
real scarcity, and this is something that Norwegians have difficulty understanding. For 
a lot of people life is full of difficult challenges and you cannot always take the moral 
high ground.”305 Despite the fact that the Foreign Ministry claims always to look at 
root issues in a conflict, many feel this is rather superficial as Norwegians do not have 
a good enough understanding of cultural differences and economical and material 
scarcities. It is hard to understand how people take pride in the fact that Norway 
consider peace negotiations very seriously and research the topic through and through, 
can neglect such an elementary part. “This may be due to the existence of a close nit 
community which always confirms each other’s view of reality",306 Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen comments.  
The 2011 NORAD report points out several lessons which came out of Norway`s 
efforts in Sri Lanka, but which also goes for peace building elsewhere. Sørbø et al. 
mention that “(T) there is a need to think about the balance between hard and soft 
power. Norway’s approach may be suitable to bring parties into negotiations, but 
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harder forms of leverage may be required to reach and implement a 
settlement...Norway should avoid situations where it is a weak and isolated mediator, 
with limited and inconsistent international backing. This means placing more attention 
on ‘multilateralizing’ peace processes by building links to, and borrowing the leverage 
of other more powerful actors and coalitions.”307 This is also a point that has been 
raised numerous times with the interview objects I have talked to.                   
 
Furthermore, the issue of aid in peace processes is being discussed. “Aid may play a 
supportive role in peace processes, but cannot short circuit complex political 
processes. Aid cannot be a substitute for politics. Moreover, poorly conceived aid has 
the potential to destabilize fragile political settlements. This necessarily involves a 
more modest but conflict sensitive role for aid in the context of peace processes.”308              
If the knowledge of local history and core problems to the conflict are not fully 
known, the provision of aid could worsen a situation. Norway played many different 
roles in Sri Lanka, including humanitarian and development funder, diplomatic broker 
as well as arbiter of the ceasefire. As some of these roles are not naturally combined it 
is vital to create a stronger strategy to manage different roles simultaneously.309 As the 
“war on terror” has spread, new rules and strategies had to develop. “Norway has 
usually been a mediator in conflicts between a state and non-state actor, based on an 
approach of even-handedness and addressing issues of asymmetry. The Sri Lankan 
case highlights the difficulties of following such an approach in the context of the war 
on terror. This suggests a need for careful reflection on whether it is possible for 
Norway to square the circle of showing a united front with other international players 
on countering terrorism, whilst attempting to talk with ‘terrorists’ in order to bring 
peace.”310  
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“Norway’s opportunity to play a role depends on the general power balance in the 
world, and how Norway has positioned itself in accordance to this,”311 Kristian 
Harpviken says. The Foreign Ministry has realized that what was not possible during 
the 90`s is now possible, after 2001. “After 2001, this solo role has been much more 
limited”, “we can no longer work solo, we have to cooperate with others”312 for the 
wanted result. This is a result of Norway`s lack of hard power.  
An anonymous source claims that Norway has to communicate with their colleagues 
more than they do. “Unless you’re in this field, you don’t necessarily know what they 
are doing, you just have a vague understanding that Norway is doing something 
constructive...An example is the Oslo Forum. The Oslo Forum is a phenomenal event, 
behind closed door, which is what makes it special and unique, it’s an opportunity for 
mediators to really talk to each other, but they do not like other governments to be 
there. In some ways that inhibits the ability of others to build their capacity as well, as 
you’re not allowed on site.”313 They want to learn more than they are willing to offer 
others. Although it is not Norway`s responsibility to ensure other states` capacity of 
peace negotiations, this attitude is against all that the Norwegians think they represent.  
 
To have a clear exit strategy is vital. As well as a realistic plan B. Peace negotiation 
failures far outweigh their successes. “There is a need for greater realism and better 
political analysis when preparing for negotiations”314, Oliver Walton comments. 
David Malone says what is vital for Norway to continue with peace negotiations in the 
future is “a large bank account (which it will have for the foreseeable future), political 
leadership with vision and a risk-taking disposition, and excellent negotiators.”315   
The Norwegian politicians and ex-politicians interviewed about what Norway should 
focus on to continue peace negotiations, have slightly different ideas to the other 
interview objects. It is important to continue to have support for this in the Norwegian 
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314 Walton, Oliver. Interviewed by email. 27.02.2012.  
315 Malone, David. Interviewed by email. 21. 03.2012.  
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people, says Gro Harlem Brundtland,316 whilst Thorvald Stoltenberg comments that it 
is important to “Be ourselves! Know what values we have. Some might read this and 
think that he does not know how self-centred we can seem, that we can easily 
exaggerate ourselves, but to this I say: for a small country it is natural to be self 
centred.”317 We need to focus on Norway`s interest, and not apologise for taking the 
word, he states.318 Knut Vollebæk claims that stamina is very important for Norway to 
continue their involvement in peace negotiations. “I think Norway has an advantage 
here, in comparison to larger countries. I remember from my engagement in the 
Balkans, we were asked to guarantee that the meeting would be positive, and we had 
to say that we could guarantee that it probably would not be positive. This led to the 
loss of interest, because they expected results immediately, but we have been willing 
to work with issues and engagement over longer periods of time, without having quick 
or immediate results. We are willing to put resources into processes that might take a 
long time.”319 It is important to be able to get involved in peace negotiations for a 
longer period of time, however, it is equally important to know when to leave and not 
overstay your welcome.                                                                                                            
Jan Egeland points out that he does not think there will be many “Oslo Agreements” 
in the future, “our role is different and we will to a higher degree be acting as a 
facilitator for the UN and to regional organizations.”320 The times have changed and 
the unique composition of factors present at the time of the Oslo Process is unlikely to 
appear again. Jan Egeland raises another interesting point as he explains that during 
the most spectacular agreements Norway achieved, like Guatemala and Palestine, 
when we got started with Sri Lanka and Sudan, there was no one who was employed 
at the Foreign Ministry with this as a portfolio. Now you have a whole department in 
the Foreign Ministry that works full time with these issues.321   
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When Jonas Gahr Støre was asked about this issue he stated that “I have learnt that 
using the term “success” only for when you get parties to sit around a table, signing an 
agreement is too narrow a definition. What we do, in most cases, is to contribute to a 
positive development.” If your requirement for joining is “success”, it is not 
possible!”322 When Norway`s role as a peace negotiator was seen as a side project, the 
results had a lot more impact than now when the foreign ministry, as well as a large 
number of NGOs and research facilities have a full time focus. Can this have been 
“beginners luck”? Back in the 1990`s there were many actors who strived for peace 
negotiations, but not as many as there are today. Can it be a case of the more chefs, 
the more mess!? When so many actors are joining forces to produce an international 
peace negotiation agreement, this may only end up complicating the situation.  
 
6.2 Concluding remarks  
Before I started my research I was curious to see how many interview objects I would 
manage to reach, and of course whom. This proved to be easier than I expected and 
most of the people were more outspoken than I anticipated. During my research I was 
also surprised by the number of critical voices to Norway`s work as a peace 
negotiator. Due to this, I feel I have sufficient grounds to conclude that there might be 
a gap between the Norwegians` vs. non-Norwegians` perceptions on this matter.   
Harpviken and Skjelsbæk conclude their 2010 articles with the following quote: “The 
Norwegian government cannot choose to look past Norwegian interests or become 
pacifists. However, the peace politics are not saved by making it a part of interest 
based security politics...It is important to clarify what Norway does and does not do 
when practising peace politics. Only in this way it will be possible to get a principled 
clarification of fundamental values and the distinctiveness of the peace politics”323  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Støre, Jonas Gahr. Interviewed by phone. 04.07.2012.  
323 Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Skjelsbæk, Inger (2010) ”Tilslørt fredspolitikk” Page 379-388, in Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift # 4. Universitetsforlaget. (translated by E. Nordviste.) p. 387.  
	  	  
81	  
There is no doubt that Norway`s peace politics has achieved some success. Especially 
the NGOs contribute has been, and still is, vital. However, it is Norway`s connections, 
the enthusiasm to take on tasks other larger powers will not, and to fill gaps, that has 
made Norway appear as an important player in peacemaking.324 This cooperation will 
leave a win-win situation for Norway as well as for the major powers, but not always 
for the parties involved in the conflict. Norway attempts to gain power through 
international peace negotiations and through enforcing international norms and laws. 
This can also be seen in the country`s leading efforts with the landmine and cluster 
munition bans. 
“Norwegian foreign policy makers have got an extra incentive (to) make the image of 
Norway as a peace nation more visible to the outside world, and might thereby 
reinforce the Norwegian self-image which took part in forming the peace policies in 
the first place. Hence, the reciprocal relationship between practices and identities is 
further strengthened.”325 The self image developed due to characteristics that makes it 
possible for Norway to carry out any sort of peacemaking, has resulted in many 
“seeing it as self-evident that Norway is especially suited to, and has a special 
responsibility to, actively promote peace.”326  
The idea that the Norwegian people are naturally peaceful, and that the foreign policy 
is controlled by the people, does not automatically make the foreign policy peaceful!                  
The people who have been involved in peace negotiations through Norwegian history 
have had perceptions of Norway`s successes that goes beyond reality. This may have 
been done to uphold a legacy, and maybe also to an extent to justify the negotiators` 
own actions.  
“There is no interest for Norway, but for our role,”327 Erik Solheim says. This is for 
example due to the fact that Norway can talk to parties and countries the USA cannot, 
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or will not talk to. This distinction seems to be overlooked by many. Most other states 
see Norway as a country with little hard power and lots of money and enthusiasm. For 
the most part, letting such an actor attempt to facilitate peace negotiations is harmless, 
and as a more powerful state often is needed to “close the deal” other gets to share 
Norway`s spotlight.  
Norway is a state with some good characteristics for carrying out this type of work, 
but as it has no hard, and only moral power, this is not enough to be the international 
peace creating nation that some intensely dream of.  There is a disconnection between 
what Norwegians think of themselves and the reality of Norway as a peace negotiating 
nation. The people feel they are the ones who create peace, however, the fact is that it 
is the parties who negotiate peace agreements whilst Norway facilitates the process 
who creates the peace. The point is not that Norway is not trying to do good, but 
rather that the national identity of Norwegians is strongly exaggerated.  Parts of this 
are the politicians` responsibility who I believe wishes the image of Norwegians as 
somewhat extraordinarily peaceful was real. They fire up under this image to keep it 
alive and hope that they themselves will somehow catch a small piece of the 
“superpower” that is spreading peace and helping others.                                                 
Unfortunately, just because Norway has seen some great countrymen throughout its 
history, does not make all Norwegians grand peace creators.  
Despite mostly good intentions and honest desires to see results and changes, the 
political ambitions might seem too overwhelming. Unrealistic expectations and too 
high belief in the total of all domestic skills needed for success can help to explain the 
notable mismatch between efforts and results, and the view Norwegians and non-
Norwegians have on this issue. Norwegians as peace negotiators is not necessarily a 
bad idea, but to make it a “trademark” for Norwegians or an “export article” for 
Norway is far from realistic.  
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Appendix 1: Overview of interview objects, categorised. 
 
NOTE: Some of these individuals can be placed under multiple categories, however I 
will only put them in the one I see most fit.  
Norwegian politicians/bureaucrats: 
 
• Jonas Gahr Støre (Current Minister of Foreign Affairs) 
• Jon Hanssen-Bauer (Peace and Reconciliation, Foreign Ministry) 
• Eva Helene Østbye (NORAD) 
• Petter Bauck (NORAD) 
• Geir Otto Pedersen (Foreign Ministry)  
 
Norwegian ex-politicians: 
 
• Kjell Magne Bondevik (Previous Prime Minister) 
• Gro Harlem Brundtland (Previous Prime Minister, member of The Elders 
UN.)  
• Thorvald Stoltenberg (Previous Foreign Minister) 
• Erik Solheim 
• Knut Vollebæk (Previous Ambassador to the US, previous Foreign Minister) 
 
Foreign ex-politicians: 
 
• Jimmy Carter (Previous President of the USA, The Elders UN) 
 
Norwegian diplomats/Foreign Ministry bureaucrats:  
• Tore Toreng (Ambassador to Nepal) 
• Jens-Petter Kjemprud (Ambassador to Sudan) 
• Hans Brattskar (Previous Ambassador to Sri Lanka) 
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• Terje Rød-Larsen (Heavily involved in the Oslo Process, President of the 
International Peace Institute) 
• Wegger Strømmen (Previous Ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador 
to the US) 
 
Foreign diplomats/Foreign Ministry bureaucrats: 
 
• Ben Rowswell (Canadian diplomat) 
• Elissa Golberg (Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the Office of 
the United Nations at Geneva and to the United Nations Conference on 
Disarmament, in Geneva.) 
• Kai Sauer (Finnish Ambassador to Indonesia, worked with Mr. Ahtissari) 
• Kimmo Kiljunen (Special Representative for Peace Mediation of the Finnish 
Foreign Minister) 
Norwegian NGO workers: 
• Kristian Harpviken (PRIO) 
• Stein Tønnesson, (PRIO) 
• Orrvar Dalby (Previous Secretary-General ,Norwegian People`s Aid) 
• Andreas Indregard (Norwegian People`s Aid) 
• Arne Ørum (Rådet for Psykisk helse, aid worker in Middle East for more than 
20 years) 
• Gunnar Sørbø (Co-writer of  NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, Senior 
Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute) 
 
Foreign NGO workers: 
• David Malone (President of International Development Research Center, 
Canada) 
• Barbara Simmons (Executive Director of The Peace Center, US) 
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• Oliver Watson (Research Fellow, The Governance and Social Development 
Resource Centre, UK) 
• Jehan Perera (National Peace Council for Sri Lanka) 
• Bart Klem (Co-writer of  NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, Bart Klem 
Research) 
• Jan Egeland (Deputy Director of Human Rights Watch and the Director of 
Human Rights Watch Europe)  
• Vidar Helgensen (Director IDEA, Sweden) 
• Scott Weber (Director General of Interpeace, Geneva) 
 
Norwegian academics: 
• Terje Tvedt (Professor, University of Bergen) 
• Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Professor, University of Oslo) 
 
Foreign academics: 
• Isak Svensson (Associate Professor and Postdoctoral Fellow at The National  
     Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Zealand) 
• David Petrasek (Associate Professor, University of Ottawa, Canada) 
• Jonathan Goodhand (Co-writer of  NORADs “Pawns of Peace” report, 
    Professor, SOAS, London) 
• Kristine Høglund (Uppsala University, Sweden)  
 
Norwegian media: 
• Sidsel Wold (Journalist, NRK) 
• Kjell Dragnes (Journalist, Aftenposten) 
• Hans-Wilhelm Steinfeld (Journalist, NRK) 
• Fredrik Græsvik (Journalist, TV2) 
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• Gro Holm (Journalist, NRK) 
 
Others that I have met with to discuss my topic:  
• Sigmund Bekken (UNE) 
• Ann Jones (Journalist, USA) 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide used in the research of this thesis 
 
1. According to you, how is Norway seen as an international peace negotiator by 
other states? 
2. Why get involved in peace negotiations at all? What effects can this 
involvement have on a state`s foreign policies? 
3. What advantages, if any, would you say Norway has as an international peace 
negotiator? 
4. Are there any characteristics that can be said to be specific for Norway`s way 
of doing peace negotiations? E.g. have a good contact on each side before 
starting etc. 
5. How important would you say Norwegian NGO`s are in the peace negotiation 
projects?  Do they seem independent from the Norwegian state? 
6. What are important requirements for Norway to continue to work with peace 
negotiations in the future? 
7. Why do you think that some Norwegians consider themselves better and more 
active on the international peace negotiating arena then they perhaps are?  
8. Is there any literature on the main topic of how Norway is seen by other states 
as a peace negotiator you may recommend?  
9. Are there any persons you would recommend me to contact who has been 
involved in peace negotiations and/or have knowledge regarding this field?  
 
